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  Glossary
BCEA – Basic Conditions of Employment Act
LRA – Labour Relations Act
LFS – Labour Force Survey
DoL – Department of Labour 
NEDLAC – National Economic Development and Labour Council
CCMA – Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration
COFESA – Confederation of Employers of South Africa
ECC – Employment Conditions Commission
SARS – South African Revenue Service
UIF – Unemployment Insurance Fund
Tokiso – Tokiso means “fix it up” in Sotho. They provide independent 
dispute settlement services to the private and public sectors.
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Executive Summary
There are about 9.5 million employees in the country that are covered by the Labour
Relations Act (LRA) and Basic Conditions Employment Act (BCEA). Of these, about 25 per
cent are covered by bargaining council agreements and about 36 per cent are covered by
sectoral determinations. The remaining 39 per cent are covered only by the BCEA (including
those covered by ministerial determinations and the ‘old’ sectoral determinations). Only
bargaining councils and sectoral determinations prescribe minimum wages, with bargaining
council wages generally above the levels set in sectoral determinations.
Bargaining Councils
The research underscores the diversity of bargaining councils, and the dangers of making
generalisations about them. There are very big councils covering the entire country and a
number of sectors and sub-sectors, there are national councils with a fairly narrow sectoral
focus, there are regional councils that together cover a reasonable proportion of an industry,
and there are small local councils that cover only a few hundred workers. The main
agreements of councils also differ. Some are long and extremely complex, full of intricacies
built up over years of negotiations, while others are relatively straightforward. The same
applies to staffing and benefit funds, which vary considerably from council to council.
Bargaining councils cover just less than a third of employees that are potentially covered by
collective bargaining (i.e. people working for someone else in occupational categories 4-9 of
the Labour Force Survey). Just less than 5 per cent of all such employees are covered by
extended agreements, i.e. are employed at non-parties that are registered with councils.
There are only two sectors in which bargaining councils have both a significant presence
overall and where the number of employees covered by extended agreements is relatively
high, i.e. Manufacturing and Transport. In both cases, however, the proportion of employees
in the relevant occupational categories that are covered by extended agreements is below
16 per cent. The above does not mean that bargaining councils do not create problems for
small businesses. 
In theory the way in which small businesses should address any problems that they have
with bargaining councils is by joining or forming employers’ organisations and making their
voices heard in the mandating process prior to and during negotiations. This should result in
agreements that better accommodate the sorts of problems they face. It is this approach that 
the new LRA endorsed by enjoining all councils to include in their constitutions provision for
representation by small and medium businesses.
The shortcoming of the above provision is that it requires nothing more concrete than an
amendment to the constitutions of councils. The Act does not require positive action on the
part of councils and their employer parties to recruit small businesses and accommodate
them in their mandating processes and in negotiations. The two quantitative requirements in
the Act for the extension of agreements – employees of party employers as a proportion of
all employees, and members of party trade unions as a proportion of all employees – also do
not put pressure on employer parties to organise small firms. An employers’ organisation
with a minority of large employers can meet the first requirement. A third measure – party
employers as a proportion of all employers – would put pressure on employers’
organisations to put effort into recruiting and retaining small firms as members.
The bargaining council system as a whole is comfortably representative on the first and
second measures (i.e. the ones in section 32 of the Act) but is unrepresentative on the third
measure: party employers make up only 41 per cent of all registered employers. As many as
24 councils (out of 41) are unrepresentative on the third measure. National councils and
other large councils are even less representative on the third measure than the system as a
whole (seven of the nine councils in this category are unrepresentative on this measure). It
should be emphasised, however, that this is looking at the issue of representivity purely on
the basis of numbers.
The data on representivity also points to the relatively low union density in the bargaining
council system. While trade unions are representative in the bargaining council system as a
whole, at 13 of the 41 councils party trade unions have 50 per cent or less membership
amongst employees. Again, national and other large councils fare badly on this measure of
repesentivity: seven of the nine councils in this category are unrepresentative on the
measure.
In the vast majority of cases the party employers on councils are on average larger than the
non-party employers (in employment terms). However, overall the party firms are not
particularly big (the average size is 27 employees) and do not outweigh non-party firms by
very much (the latter employ on average 11 employees). The data therefore shows that the
bargaining council system predominantly covers fairly small firms. 
However, the average size of party firms at most of the large national councils is significantly
bigger than the average size of non-party firms as well as being much bigger than the
average size of party firms at the smaller councils. 
Where party employers are considerably larger than non-party employers – such as at the
large national councils - the employer parties tend to also be unrepresentative of all
employers. The six national councils at which party employers are on average considerably
bigger than non-party employers are all unrepresentative on the third measure (i.e.
employer parties as a proportion of all parties), some by a considerable margin. The big
national councils therefore appear to rely on employers’ organisations dominated by large
firms to get their employment representivity up nationally, but the national scope of the
councils clearly makes it difficult to organise the many smaller employers in the relevant
sector.
Data from the Department of Labour (DoL) shows that at 11 of 27 councils more than 40 per
cent of small firms were members of the party employers’ organisations. Almost all of the 11
councils are relatively small local or regional councils. At nine councils between 21 per cent
to 40 per cent of small firms were members of the party employers’ organisation, and at
seven councils 20 per cent or less of the small firms were members of the party employers’
organisations. Therefore, at a relatively large number of councils a fairly large proportion of
small firms are represented on the council. In addition, small firms are generally well
organised by party trade unions. 
Generally, employers’ organisations on large national councils were less representative of
small businesses than employers’ organisations at smaller regional and local councils.
However, the relatively high levels of party trade union membership at small firms was fairly
evenly spread across all sizes of council.
Interviews conducted with officials of nine bargaining councils showed that at most of the
councils one or more of the employer representatives had been appointed to specifically
represent the interests of small firms. Such representation was generally seen as effective,
although it was acknowledged that the appointed representatives were in the minority on the
council. Most interviewees were aware of the difficulty small firms had in organising amongst 
themselves and participating in a council, but interviewees drew different conclusions, with
some indicating that better organisation would lead to more effective representation
whereas others suggested that it was an insurmountable problem with which councils simply 
had to live.
The interviews indicated that a key factor in the way that some councils had ameliorated
tensions around small business representation was the introduction of blanket exemptions
for small and/or new firms or a dedicated exemption procedure for small firms. A good
example of such an exemption is provided by the Furniture (Northern Region) bargaining
council, which provides for the phasing in of new firms that have 10 or less employees to full
compliance over a period of about three years. The Metal and Engineering council provides
a good example of a special exemption procedure for small businesses.
Two methods were used to estimate the number of unregistered firms within the scope of
councils. The first was to get council officials to estimate what proportion of employers and
employees were unregistered. The estimates indicated that at ten councils the proportion of
unregistered to registered employers was 20 per cent or higher, and at five of these councils
the estimate was 40 per cent or higher. The second method was to use the LFS data to
provide an employment figure for a sector against which a council’s data on registration
could be compared. For various technical reasons the latter method could be applied to only
three councils. This method found that 24 per cent of employees covered by the Clothing
Industry bargaining council are employed by unregistered employers, 46 per cent of
employees covered by the Textile bargaining council are employed by unregistered
employers, and 61 per cent of employees in the tanning and general goods sectors of the
Leather bargaining council are employed at unregistered firms. Such levels of
non-registration clearly constitute a major problem for the councils. We emphasise,
however, that these calculations and the estimates of council officials must be treated with
caution. 
The above estimates raise the question of how the DoL calculates the representivity of
parties to bargaining councils. DoL officials state that they measure representivity with
respect to all employees within the jurisdiction of the council and not just employees at
registered firms. But this means they run into problem of getting accurate data on the total
number of employers and employees that fall within the sectors and regions covered by
councils. Such data is not available and this poses a challenge for the whole issue of
representivity as the basis for extending agreements.
Enforcement is an issue closely associated with levels of non-registration and
non-compliance. The research found that generally bargaining councils did not have a great
deal of enforcement capacity. The number of agents (inspectors) employed by councils
varied considerably according to the size of the council, with the large national councils
employing the most agents (except those that did not extend their agreements) and the
small local councils employing the fewest. However, the ratio of employees to agents at the
large national councils tends to be much larger than the ratio at the regional and local
councils. The smaller local and regional councils also conducted more inspections per agent 
than the larger national councils and tended to spend considerably more time tracking down
unregistered firms. On the other hand, the large national councils issued far more
compliance orders, which increased sharply over the period. One could extrapolate from
these findings that non-compliance and non-registration is greater at large councils than at
smaller councils, with more incentive for small firms to not register with the council. 
The changes introduced by the new LRA have had an impact on the exemption systems of
councils. Most have set up independent bodies to hear appeals (those that have not are
probably councils that do not extend agreements), and most have developed criteria for
considering exemptions and have published the criteria in their collective agreements.
Unfortunately, councils have developed lists of about eight or nine criteria and there is no
clarity with regard to how they weigh up the criteria in considering an application for
exemption.
The number of exemption applications being received by councils showed a significant rise
between 2000 and 2004, with the success rate (exemptions granted in full, partially granted
and subject to conditions) above 70 per cent over the period. However, the success rate of
applications to large national councils showed a steady decline over the period, while the
success rate of applications to regional and small national councils increased from just over
fifty percent to almost ninety percent. 
Only a small proportion of refused exemption applications are taken on appeal: less than 20
per cent of refusals by councils result in appeals and the total number of appeals is low. The
success of appeals tends to be quite low, although in 2004 the success rate increased
significantly.    
The largest proportion of exemption applications came from small firms: in 2002 and 2004
about two-thirds of all applications were from small firms (as defined by each bargaining
council).
The refusal rate for exemption applications from small firms was lower than for all firms and
was declining. Data supplied by the DoL revealed a similar refusal rate for small firm
applications.
The vast majority of exemption applications came from non-party firms. The refusal rate for
applications from non-parties is somewhat higher than the refusal rate from all firms (but the
refusal rate was an estimate by respondents rather than based on actual figures). 
The survey found that the largest proportion of exemption applications was with respect to
council benefit funds. This was followed by exemptions from the wage clause and other
types of exemptions. Few applications were for exemption from the entire agreement. More
research is needed to establish why so many applications were made with respect to the
benefit funds. One explanation is that firms have set up alternative funds. However, it could
be that firms find the costs associated with the benefit funds excessive.
Interviews with council officials indicated that blanket exemptions were instrumental in
defusing tensions between big and small firms. However, only a minority of councils have
made provision for blanket exemptions. Most of these councils base their categorisation for
such exemptions on the size of the firm but there were some that did so according to the type
of business. Overall the blanket exemptions do not cover large numbers of workers. 
BCEA and Sectoral Determinations
There are currently nine sectoral determinations that cover just over 1 million employers and 
almost 3.5 million employees. There is no data on the coverage of ministerial determinations 
or the wage determinations that were converted to sectoral determinations by the 2002
amendment to the BCEA. The latter determinations, however, are probably so out of date
that they have very limited application.
It is unknown what the level of compliance is with the BCEA and sectoral determinations.
Arguably there is probably a low level of compliance because of the limited enforcement
capacity of the DoL: only 706 inspectors are spread across 10 main offices. According to the
DoL the inspectors conducted about 184 000 inspections in the period April to December
2004, which translates into an average of about 347 inspections per inspector per year. Total 
inspections make up a relatively small proportion of all employers covered by the sectoral
determinations let alone the remainder covered by the BCEA.
The argument that there are low levels of compliance is somewhat contradicted by the low
number of compliance orders issued by inspectors in 2003 and 2004. However, the low
number of compliance orders could also be the result of a relatively low number of
inspections compared to the number of employers.
The procedure to apply for a variation determination (i.e. an exemption) and the relevant
form have been made public by the DoL, but the guidelines used by DoL to assess
applications have not been made public or do not enjoy very wide publicity.
It is difficult to assess the success rate of applications for variation. Data was obtained for
three years. The first two years both appear to be exceptional in that a very high number of
applications – mostly related to the Agriculture sectoral determination - were not finalised: in
2002/3 only 25 per cent of all applications were granted (with 72 per cent pending) and in
2003/4 only 16 per cent were granted (with 81 per cent pending). If one leaves out the
pending applications and counts only exemptions granted and refused, the success rate
was 98 per cent in 2002/3 and 97 per cent in 2003/4. In 2004/5, when there were far fewer
pending applications but a large number unaccounted for, 63 per cent were granted and 37
per cent refused.
The biggest category of exemption applications from the BCEA was with respect to the
overtime provisions, followed by daily and weekly rest periods. The vast majority of
applications for exemption from sectoral determinations were with respect to the Agricultural 
determination, mostly relating to the wage clause.
   
Part A:  Introduction
  
1.  Background to the Research
During the 1980s small business began to vociferously oppose labour market regulations,
arguing that the regulations threatened the viability of many small firms because they did not
take account of the circumstances and problems faced by such businesses. Adding weight
to their argument was the increasing level of unemployment and the view that small
businesses could generate a significant number of new jobs. Industrial councils were
singled out for criticism, especially the mechanism to extend industrial council agreements
to non-parties and the exemption system. It was argued that the former allowed industrial
councils – with big business dominant on the employer side - to impose their agreements on
firms that were not party to the negotiations. Big businesses, the argument went, were
reaching agreements with unions that had the effect of eliminating their smaller (non-party)
competitors when extended. The counterweight to the extension of agreements – the
exemption system – was criticised for being ineffective and/or biased against small firms.
The architects of the 1995 LRA took cognisance of some of the concerns of small
businesses. The approach, however, was not to exclude small businesses, but rather to
persuade them to participate in the system and in that way secure conditions that better
suited them. The new Act therefore provided that all bargaining councils would have to
include in their constitutions provision for representation of small and medium enterprises on 
the council. Furthermore, the Act tried to tighten up the requirements to be met by the parties
to bargaining councils before an agreement would be extended: clear quantitative
representivity thresholds are set for the extension of agreements; agreements must make
provision for an independent body to hear appeals by non-parties against the refusal of an
application for exemption;1 and, agreements must set out the criteria that will be applied by
the independent exemptions body when it considers an appeal and these criteria must be fair and
promote the primary objectives of the Act.
The 1997 BCEA also attempted to accommodate small businesses concerns. It provides for
a certain amount of variation by the Minister (through ministerial determinations and sectoral 
determinations), bargaining councils, collective agreement, or individual agreement; the
scope for variation tends to narrow as one descends this hierarchy. Furthermore,
promulgation of the Act itself was held up while research was conducted to establish whether 
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1 Initially the Act required that the independent body hear all applications for exemption from non-parties. It was
amended in 1998 to apply to appeals only.
it would impact negatively on small businesses. The outcome of the impact assessment
research was a ministerial determination that relaxed certain provisions in the BCEA for
businesses employing fewer than ten people.
The President’s State of the Nation speech, ANC discussion documents, and a number of
press statements indicate that there is a strong perception in a number of quarters that the
LRA and BCEA are not sufficiently accommodative of small business problems and
interests. A particular concern has been the extension of bargaining council agreements,
which in turn implies an inadequately functioning exemption system. It is this concern, we
understand, that prompted the request to conduct this research.
    2.  Conceptualisation of the Research 
A number of approaches could be adopted to examine whether the current statutory and
other mechanisms for setting wages and conditions of employment were not sufficiently
accommodative of small businesses. Probably the best approach would be to examine the
actual impact of extended bargaining council agreements, sectoral determinations, and the
BCEA on a sample of small firms, as well as the experience such firms have when applying
for exemptions.
It was, however, not conceivable to conduct such research within the time frame for this
project. Instead, we have focused on the laws and institutions themselves, examining their
coverage and provisions for exemptions or variation, as well as their capacity to enforce their 
agreements. We also collected quantitative data in respect of these aspects over the period
2000 to 2004. For example, we have collected information on the nature of the exemption
systems at bargaining councils as well as data on the number of exemption applications
received, the number granted, the number granted with conditions, the number refused, etc.
2.1   Coverage and Representivity
Our approach was that in order to understand how legislation and bargaining council
agreements could be impacting on small businesses, one needs to start with an examination 
of the coverage of the legislation and the various wage setting mechanisms. This will put into 
perspective the number of employers and employees actually covered by such mechanisms 
and the numbers that are not covered. We take this examination a step further in the case of
bargaining councils by splitting their coverage into total coverage and the proportion of
employers and employees covered by the extension of agreements. 
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This enquiry involves examining the representivity of bargaining councils, i.e. the number of
employers who are members of party employers’ organisations as opposed to those that are
not (so-called non-parties) as well as the number of employees of party and non-party
employers and the number of employees that are members of party trade unions. We sought 
to break this data down further into the number of small firms that are parties and
non-parties, and the numbers that each category employs. This would provide a quantitative
view of representivity of bargaining councils and how small firms feature in the negotiation of
bargaining council agreements. In-depth interviews sought to add a qualitative dimension to
this picture, in order to give some sense of whether quantitative representation translated
into actual power within councils.
2.2   Non-Compliance2
An issue related to coverage and representivity is the level of compliance with the relevant
mechanisms. The data on bargaining councils is generally confined to the firms that
bargaining councils know about, i.e. those firms that are registered with the council.
Similarly, representivity is measured primarily according to how many of the registered firms
are members of the party employers’ organisations and how many registered firms are not
members. What this data does not take account of is the number of unregistered firms (and
their employees) operating within the jurisdiction of a council. Adding in data on the number
of unregistered firms is important for four reasons. First, it adds some detail to our
knowledge about the coverage of bargaining councils. Second, it can give a different
perspective on the representivity of bargaining councils. In other words, the proportion of
firms that are parties to an agreement could shrink significantly if a large number of
non-compliant firms was added to the number of non-party firms. 
Third, some measure of the extent of non-registration by firms gives an indication of the
capacity of bargaining councils and the Department of Labour (DoL) to enforce agreements
and determinations. High levels of non-registration would therefore indicate limited
enforcement capacity on the part of the relevant institution. Fourth, and related to the last
point, the level of non-registration is also an indication of whether the relevant exemption
system is utilised and perceived to be effective. Put simply, if most firms choose not to
register with a bargaining council’s agreement rather than register and apply for an
Conditions of Employment and Small Business: Coverage, Compliance and Exemptions
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2 It is important to note that generally we use the term non-compliance to mean non-registration with bargaining
councils. Non-compliance could also mean that a firm is registered with a council but is not complying with one or
other aspect of its agreement(s). However, the latter is not an issue we investigated. So, compliance generally
refers to registration with a bargaining council and non-compliance refers to non-registration. With regard to the
BCEA and sectoral determinations, where registration does not take place, non-compliance would generally
mean a firm not complying with the BCEA or the relevant sectoral determination.
exemption, it suggests there is a problem with the exemption system (or there is a strong
perception that there is a problem). 
Unfortunately, measuring the extent of non-registration is difficult because the way Statistics
SA breaks down sectors is not necessarily the same as the way in which bargaining councils
define their industrial scope. This means that in only a few cases can one compare Statistics
SA employment data with the coverage of councils in order to get a measure of
non-registration.
2.3   Enforcement
We did not, however, want to rely only on the above quantitative calculations to get an
indication of enforcement capacity and how exemption systems were or were not working.
We also sought to examine the latter two issues through a more detailed enquiry at
bargaining councils and the DoL. So we asked councils and the DoL about the number of
designated agents/inspectors they had, how many inspections were performed, etc.
Ultimately we wanted to test how rigorously agreements and determinations were being
enforced, because an argument can be made that limited enforcement capacity implies an
‘accommodation’ of small firms because this allows a proportion of them to ignore
regulations with impunity. This enquiry reflects back on the coverage of councils, sectoral
determinations, etc. It also reflects on the exemption system.
2.4   Exemptions (or Variations)
The exemption (or variation) system is the ‘safety valve’ allowing all firms to apply for some
or other concession with respect to the agreement or determination covering them. Such
systems are particularly relevant for small firms because this is the main way in which the
legislation accommodates the problems that small firms have in complying with minimum
conditions. However, the exemption system is only open to those firms that are complying or
seeking to comply with the relevant conditions (albeit asking for certain concessions). The
exemption system is not used by those employers who are not complying. Such firms have
effectively exempted themselves. We therefore enquired into the working of the exemption
and variation systems as well as getting quantitative data the number of exemptions applied
for, how many were granted, etc. Again, this data should not be viewed in isolation. It should
be examined in the light of the representative position of a council, the level of
non-registration, and the capacity of the council to enforce its agreements. 
Our conceptual approach was therefore to gather data on coverage, representivity,
compliance, enforcement and exemptions because they are all inter-related parts of a
system of regulation. Our report presents the available data on each of these aspects and
our concluding section seeks to identify some of the connections. 
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3. Methodology
The research was required to be conducted in a very short period of time. This set a
constraint on what research methods could be used and what information could be obtained. 
Three main research methods were used. Firstly, a questionnaire was sent to the
Department of Labour to collect whatever data it has on the range of issues being
researched. Follow-ups were done to the Department to clarify certain data it supplied as
well as to attempt to fill gaps in the data.
Secondly, a questionnaire was sent to all functioning private sector bargaining councils. Our
prior experience of conducting research at bargaining councils made us aware that many
councils are reluctant to spend time gathering data and filling out questionnaires.3 We
therefore spent considerable time refining the questionnaire so that its data-gathering
requirements did not appear too onerous or time-consuming. We also put a lot of effort into
introducing the questionnaire to councils and following up in order to deal with queries and
prod councils into completing it. This involved a telephone call to all the bargaining councils
prior to sending the questionnaire. In this telephone call we identified the correct person to
send the questionnaire to at the council and also explained the nature and urgency of the
research. The questionnaire was then either faxed or emailed to the council. We thereafter
made at least one follow-up telephone call to every council to check on progress, answer
any queries and emphasise the deadline for completion and return of the questionnaire. In
the end we pushed out the deadline twice by a couple of days each time. In this period we
made further follow-up calls to those councils that had not yet submitted their
questionnaires.
As mentioned above, questionnaires were sent out to all functioning bargaining councils.
The list of councils to which questionnaires were sent was compiled from a list of all
registered bargaining councils received from the Department of Labour late in 2003.
According to the list there are a total of 58 registered councils. However, the Department
indicated that six of the councils on the list were defunct and were in the process of being
wound up. We excluded these councils from the research. A further seven of the councils
were not included because they do not fall within the private sector. These are the five public
sector councils, the local government bargaining council and the Transnet bargaining
Conditions of Employment and Small Business: Coverage, Compliance and Exemptions
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council.4 One other council on the list was excluded, namely the National Bargaining Council 
for the Wood and Paper Sector. This council was registered in May 2005 and would
therefore have little of the data we were seeking (although it did participate in the research by 
providing us with data on representivity).5  
The list to which questionnaires would be sent therefore comprised 44 bargaining councils.
However, in the course of contacting councils prior to sending the questionnaire we
established that two of the councils were defunct and one other had to all practical purposes
merged with another council (it was being administered by the other council).
Questionnaires were therefore sent to 41 bargaining councils, which we believe comprise all 
the functioning councils in the private sector (see Annexure A). We got 29 completed
questionnaires back from councils (although how much data was supplied in response to
questions varied from council to council).
Thirdly, we attempted to administer a short interview schedule telephonically at 12
bargaining councils. This aimed at providing more qualitative evidence regarding the
dynamics on the council between big and small businesses. The councils were selected
using data that we had already compiled on the average size of party and non-party firms in
councils. The primary selection criterion was those councils where the average size of party
firms was significantly bigger than the average size of non-party firms. This difference would
imply conditions where large party firms might be dominating councils and using
agreements to eliminate competition from small non-party firms. Ultimately we managed to
complete nine of these interviews.
Bargaining councils are very diverse. They range from very large national councils to small
local councils. In the report that follows we generally present the data split into three
categories, i.e. large national and other large councils; regional and small national councils;
and, small regional and local councils, as well as providing data for all the councils. This will
give a perspective on the whole system and also highlight the functioning of the major
bargaining councils in comparison to the smaller regional and local councils. 
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4 It should also be noted that these councils do not have their agreements extended so the question of non-parties
does not arise. There are also no small firms covered by these councils.
5 It has not yet produced a collective agreement for submission to the Minister.
    Part B: Bargaining Councils
   
1. The Labour Relations Act (LRA)
Bargaining councils are voluntary centralised bargaining institutions established within a
statutory framework provided by the LRA. They can therefore be established only where one 
or more trade unions and one or more employers’ organisations agree to set up a council. In
order for councils to be registered the parties to the proposed council must be sufficiently
representative of employers and employees within the scope of the proposed council. Once
registered the council can have its collective agreements extended if it meets certain
requirements. The agreements then apply to all employers and employees within the scope
of the council, rather than just the members of the party organisations. Councils must have
an exemption system in place for firms that wish to apply for an exemption from some or all
provisions in the council’s agreement(s). An independent body must be established by the
council to hear appeals where exemption applications have been refused. Outside of these
key features, councils have a lot of latitude as to the sorts of agreements they produce, how
much variation they introduce into agreements, how they police their agreements, and the
sorts of services (if any) they offer to firms within their jurisdiction.
The drafters of the new LRA were aware that many small firms opposed the extension of
industrial council agreements to non-parties and were unhappy with the exemption systems
of councils, but they also had to take account of the demands of trade unions for greater
centralisation of collective bargaining. The Act ended by making certain concessions to
small firms but without substantially altering the architecture of the framework for centralised 
bargaining.6
1.1   Representivity: Registration of Bargaining Councils 
Section 29 of the new LRA deals with the registration of bargaining councils. Leaving aside
certain formalities, the section requires that the application for registration goes to the
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) first for consideration. In
terms of Section 29(8) NEDLAC must “consider the appropriateness of the sector and area
in respect of which the application is made”, and “demarcate the appropriate sector and area 
in respect of which the bargaining council should be registered”. Once this has been done
NEDLAC must provide a written report to the registrar. Thereafter the registrar must
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6 The section that follows draws extensively on a prior report done by Godfrey, Theron and Maree for the Chamber
of Mines and National Union of Mineworkers (see the bibliography for full details).
determine whether, amongst other things, “adequate provision is made in the constitution of
the bargaining council for the representation of small and medium enterprises”, and “the
parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently representative of the sector and area
determined by NEDLAC or the Minister”.7 
The first of the above questions to be determined by the registrar is a formality that arguably
has little consequence in practice, i.e. it requires a change to a bargaining council’s
constitution without the need for there to be representation of small and medium enterprises
on the council (see further below). The second criterion is critical. It should be noted that the
term ‘sufficiently representative’ is not defined. Nor has there been any case law under the
new LRA that has given the term concrete meaning in respect of bargaining councils. 
Registration of a bargaining council therefore rests largely on the notion of ‘sufficient
representivity’. One possible change is that NEDLAC now has the authority to first decide on
the appropriate sector and area for which the bargaining council should be registered. It
could conceivably adjust the sector and area in such a way as to ensure that the parties are
actually representative, i.e. by narrowing the sector or area to exclude non-parties. However, 
prior research by ourselves indicates that NEDLAC does not do this. It interprets its brief as
being a more technical determination of the appropriate sector and area and does not go into 
the representivity of the parties. Supporting this interpretation is the fact that there is no
mention in the Act of the registrar being required to provide NEDLAC with information
regarding the representative position of the parties (although the Act does refer to the
registrar providing NEDLAC with the “application and any objections, responses and further
information”). Furthermore, section 29(11)(b) makes it clear that the question as to whether
the parties are ‘sufficiently representative’ is for the registrar to decide.8
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7 The Minister may demarcate the appropriate sector and area if NEDLAC fails to reach agreement on the
demarcation.
8 At this point it would be difficult for the registrar to decide representivity on any other basis than ‘sufficiently
representative’ because the council is only in the process of being established and it is highly unlikely that the
parties or the registrar would know the actual representivity of the parties.
1.2   Representivity: Extension of Bargaining Council Agreements
The new LRA has attempted to clarify the position regarding the extension of agreements
although there is still a grey area of Ministerial discretion. So the Minister must extend an
agreement on the request of a council if certain requirements are met. First, section 32(3)
provides that the Minister may not extend a bargaining council agreement unless satisfied
that after extension the majority of all employees covered are members of the party trade
unions, and the members of the party employers’ organisations employ the majority of the
employees. The section therefore sets clear quantitative thresholds of representivity for the
extension of agreements.9 
It can be argued that the failure to include a third criterion, namely that the party employers’
organisation(s) must represent at least 50 per cent of the total number of employers, biases
the threshold against representation by small firms. An employers’ organisation that has as
its members a few very big firms that employ the majority of employees in an industry will
meet the requirements of the section as it stands at present. If the third criterion was included 
the employers’ organisations would be compelled to get more members in order to remain
representative. This would require employers’ organisations to organise smaller firms and
retain them as members, which would in turn force employers’ organisation to be more
accommodating of small firms’ interests.    
Section 32 also provides for certain other requirements that must be met before the
agreement will be extended. First, a bargaining council agreement cannot be extended by
the Minister unless he/she is satisfied that provision is made in the agreement for an
independent body to hear appeals against the refusal by the council of a non-party’s
application for exemption or the withdrawal of an exemption by the council. Second, the
collective agreement to be extended must contain criteria that will be applied by the
independent body when it considers an appeal (and the criteria must be fair and promote the
primary objects of the Act). Finally, the terms of the collective agreement must not
discriminate against non-parties.
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9 Section 49 assists in this regard by obliging bargaining councils to provide the registrar with information regarding
representivity, while the new section 54(1)(f) requires councils to provide data regarding small firms and
employment numbers at small firms. However, this does not solve the problem of testing for representivity
because the parties must be representative of all employers and employees in the relevant industry and area, and
not just registered employers and employees. The question is how does one get an accurate measure of all
employers and employees? 
Importantly, however, section 32 goes on to give the Minister the discretion to extend an
agreement, notwithstanding the parties failure to meet the representivity thresholds, if the
parties are “sufficiently representative within the registered scope of the bargaining council”
and “the Minister is satisfied that failure to extend the agreement may undermine collective
bargaining at sectoral level or in the public service as a whole”. As noted above, the criterion
of ‘sufficient representivity’ is not defined in the Act. In determining ‘sufficient representivity’,
we submit that the Minister would primarily take account of how the parties to the council
match up to the criteria set out in section 32(3), although there would be nothing to stop the
Minister also looking at the membership position of the party employers’ organisation(s).  
There has been no case law regarding how the Minister should exercise his discretion to
extend bargaining council agreements or at what point the Minister is entitled to decide that
the failure to extend an agreement will undermine sectoral collective bargaining.10 There has
also been no research on the extension of agreements under the new Act which could shed
some light on these questions. However, it is likely that most council agreements will be
extended because it is arguable that non-extension of an agreement will always be a threat to 
sectoral collective bargaining. Further, the LRA clearly seeks to promote centralised
bargaining, an objective that is strongly supported by organised labour. These factors must
apply pressure to the Minister to interpret ‘sufficiently representative’ liberally and to extend
agreements.11
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10 There has however been case law regarding the term “sufficiently representative” in respect of organisational
rights. In one instance a union with 22 per cent membership was held to be sufficiently representative. The factors
taken into account by the CCMA were that there was no other union at the workplace, the applicant union had
been present in the workplace since the employer began operations, and the union was capable of recruiting a
majority.(UPUSA v Komming Knitting [1997] 4 BLLR 508 (CCMA)). In another case the CCMA held that a union
with 30 per cent representation in the workforce was sufficiently representative. The commissioner stated that the
requirement of sufficient representivity should not be determined by numbers alone; a union should be considered 
sufficiently representative “if it can influence negotiations, the financial interests of those engaged in the industry
or peace and stability within the industry or any section of the industry”.(SACTWU v Sheraton Textiles (Pty) Ltd
[1997] 5 BLLR 662 (CCMA)) On the other hand, the CCMA found that 6 per cent membership in the workplace
(defined nationally) did not constitute sufficient representivity for the purposes of acquiring stop-order
facilities.(OCGAWU v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd [1999] 7 BALR 813 (CCMA)). Allowing the Minister to extend on the
basis that the parties are “sufficiently representative” is recognition that representivity is not purely about numbers.
11 To date the Minister has not refused to extend a bargaining council agreement. But this does not mean that every
request for an extension has been granted. In practice, officials within the DoL screen requests for extension,
referring back to councils agreements that, for whatever reason, are not suitable for extension (an example of
such a council is the SA Road Passenger council, which currently does not have an extended agreement).
Thereafter there might be some interaction between the DoL and the relevant council in order to overcome the
problems before the agreement is re-submitted. Or the council might withdraw the request.
1.3   Representation of Small Businesses
The new LRA requires the constitution of every bargaining council to provide for “the
representation of small and medium enterprises” (section 30(b)). Unfortunately the Act does
not provide guidelines as to what form such a provision should take. Nor does it require
some minimum level of representation for small and medium firms. It therefore requires
nothing more than an amendment to the constitution. The thinking behind the provision was
nevertheless sound. It proposes that small business should organise itself and represent its
interests in the system rather than lobby against the system from outside it. If more small
businesses were to participate in the system it should lead to agreements that better
accommodate their concerns. It would also improve the representivity of bargaining
councils.12  
It is possible that the 2002 amendments to the LRA will lead to greater attention being
focussed on representation of small firms. Section 54(1)(f), which was introduced in the
2002 amendments, requires bargaining councils to submit to the registrar data regarding
small firms that fall within the scope of the council. The information includes the number of
people employed by small firms, how many are trade union members, and how many small
firms are members of the party employers’ organisation(s), as well as data regarding small
firms and exemptions (see further below). This detailed data allows the Minister to scrutinise
requests for the extension of agreements much more carefully.
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12 Recent research by Holtzhausen and Mischke (2004) highlights the importance of the admission criteria of
bargaining councils, i.e. the criteria with which employers’ organisations or trade unions wishing to join a council
must comply. Such criteria can act as a barrier to employers’ organisations representing small and medium firms,
depending on the nature of the criteria. In all cases the bargaining councils use some measure of representivity as
a threshold for admission, but these measures differ considerably. For example, the Cape Building Bargaining
Council requires that to gain admission the members of an employers’ organisation have to employ at least 500
employees in the industry. This contrasts sharply with the National Textile Bargaining Council, which requires that
the paid-up members of the employers’ organisation must employ at least 33 per cent of the total number of
employees within the scope of the relevant sub-sector.(Holtzhausen and Mischke, 2004: 43-45) In both cases the
use of employee numbers rather than number of employer members disadvantages small firms. However, the
very high threshold used by the National Textile Bargaining Council makes it almost impossible for an employers’
organisation representing small firms to gain admission to the council, whereas the much lower threshold used by
the Cape Building Bargaining Council does give such employers’ organisations a chance (although the very small
size of firms in the industry means that an employers’ organisation would probably need to organise a large
number of employers). We submit that the thresholds for admission must be set at levels that do not contradict the
injunction of section 30(b). It seems that this is something that the Department of Labour has not given much
attention to.
1.4   Enforcement and Compliance
The new LRA has probably worsened the situation regarding non-compliance with
bargaining council agreements. It de-criminalised non-compliance with agreements and at
the same time introduced a new dispute resolution procedure, which should have explicitly
included the powers and procedure whereby bargaining councils enforced their
agreements. However, it did not do so. This resulted, on the one hand, to legal challenges
from firms to bargaining councils when they attempted to enforce their agreements.13 On the 
other hand, the uncertainty regarding enforcement of council agreements possibly led to
many firms deciding to take a chance and ignore agreements.14 The problem was remedied
by the insertion of section 33A in the 2002 amendments to the LRA. 
The 2002 amendments should also solve another problem regarding enforcement. The new
dispute resolution system through which councils had to enforce agreements proved slow
and cumbersome. Bargaining council agents found it extremely difficult to bring
non-complying employers to book. When this did happen it was usually only after a long time 
and a great deal of effort. Amendments to section 33A together with Schedule 10 have given
greater powers to designated agents to enter workplaces, gather information and question
employees regarding compliance with the bargaining council’s agreement(s). In addition,
section 33A introduces an explicit and streamlined enforcement procedure: a compliance
order followed by arbitration; with the arbitrator having wide powers to order payment of
amounts owing, impose fines, charge a party an arbitration fee, and order a party to pay the
costs of the arbitration. 
While the amendment should deal with the sorts of problems that council agents faced in the
past, it is important to note that section 33A appears to give considerable latitude to councils
with regard to the enforcement procedure. The section provides that a bargaining council
may monitor and enforce compliance with its agreements in terms of section 33A or in terms
of a collective agreement concluded by the council. The section goes on to state that a
“collective agreement in terms of this section may authorise a designated agent… to issue a
compliance order requiring any person bound by that collective agreement to comply with
the collective agreement within a specified period” (our emphasis). The section further
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13 It had been established, although not without considerable confusion and some controversy, that a council could
be a party to arbitration proceedings to enforce its own agreement where an independent body conducted the
arbitration. (Du Toit et al, 2003: 268)  See, for example, Motor Industry Bargaining Council (Western Cape Region) 
v COFESA (2001) 22 ILJ 556 (ARB), and Portnet v Le Grange (1999) 20 ILJ 916 (LC). 
14 However, we have nothing more than anecdotal evidence to support this contention as well as the apparent
growth of non-compliance evidenced by the expanding informal economy.
provides that the council “may refer any unresolved dispute concerning compliance… to
arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the council” (our emphasis). The use of the
non-peremptory ‘may’ suggests that councils can, via collective agreements, put other
enforcement procedures into place. It is difficult to say what such procedures should be. The
new system of compliance order followed by arbitration appears to be sound and
expeditious. However, should employers find ways of delaying the enforcement procedure,
councils can introduce measures to close loopholes and plug gaps as they arise. 
1.5   Non-Standard Employment and Non-Registration
Informal employment has been growing rapidly. The growth has been facilitated by an
increase in sub-contracting, outsourcing and homeworking arrangements, as well as by
schemes to turn employees into independent contractors (sponsored in most cases by
COFESA). While such arrangements do not necessarily result in firms not registering or
complying with agreements or legislation, in many cases this is precisely what the effect is.
There has been a significant impact on bargaining councils. Some key councils have
collapsed because of their increasingly unrepresentative position (notable amongst these
was the Gauteng Building Bargaining Council).
Nothing was done to the framework for bargaining councils to deal with this issue. However,
the 2002 amendments introduced a supplementary definition of an ‘employee’ that provided
for seven rebuttable presumptions to establish whether an employment relationship exists.
This will have some impact, particularly with regard to the COFESA schemes.15 But we
believe that the impact will be limited for a number of reasons (we do not propose to examine
these in detail in this report). 
The 2002 amendments also introduced two new powers for bargaining councils. First,
section 28(1)(k) provides that a council now has the power “to provide industrial support
services within the sector”. The probable intention of this amendment is that bargaining
councils become more developmental, offering a range of services to small and medium
businesses that will induce them into registering with the council. Second, section 28(1)(l)
provides that a bargaining council has the power “to extend the services and functions of the
bargaining council to workers in the informal sector and home workers”. This provision
clearly goes with the preceding one: in future councils will extend the support services to
informal firms along with its functions, namely the standards set in its agreements and its
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independent contractors and actively assists its members in this regard.
benefit funds. To access the support services the informal firms will need to register and start 
complying with the council’s agreements. It is unclear what the effect of these provisions will
be. The intentions are good, but much will depend on the capacity of councils to offer support 
services as well as extend their policing of agreements into the informal economy.
1.6   Dispute Resolution
One other change has had an important impact on the capacity of bargaining councils. The
new dispute resolution system introduced by the LRA provides that councils may become
accredited to perform conciliations and arbitrations for their sectors. For doing this they
receive a subsidy per conciliation or arbitration performed. There have been two
implications of this new function for bargaining councils. First, the subsidy has proved
inadequate and conducting conciliations and, in particular, arbitrations, has put a drain on
bargaining council finances.16 Second, many councils have trained their inspectors or
agents to perform conciliations and, in some cases, arbitrations. This has obviously placed
an additional burden on the inspectorate. 
Recent research indicates that bargaining councils view the dispute resolution function as a
very important part of their role within a sector. There are two options with regard to how they
perform dispute resolution.(Hotzhausen and Mischke, 2004: 65-67) The Metal and
Engineering Industry Bargaining Council has contracted out its dispute resolution function in 
its entirety to an outside agency, while most other councils have retained dispute resolution
as an in-house function (although the panels of conciliators and arbitrators include differing
proportions of outsiders). Neither route solves the problems of expense and capacity.
Indeed the former council acknowledges that it is extremely costly to contract out dispute
resolution but it indicated that it did not have the capacity (in terms of staff and skills) to run
the dispute resolution function itself. 
While the in-house option is less expensive, it still imposes a financial burden on the council
(which will vary according to how many outsiders the council has on its conciliation and
arbitration panels) and also puts pressure on staff (which will, again, vary according to how
many outsiders the council has on its conciliation and arbitration panels). For example, the
National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight Industry conducts dispute resolution
in-house but with outsiders on its panels because its staff does not have the skills to do
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conciliations or arbitrations. The research therefore indicates that councils are faced with a
difficult balancing act in taking on the dispute resolution function in terms of the new LRA. 
One way of easing the burden would be to charge a dispute resolution levy (an option that is
being investigated by the National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry). However,
this is likely to raise the ire of small firms, which complain that the costs imposed by
bargaining councils are already too high. Alternatively, the new section 33A has the potential
to reduce costs. A more radical option would be to substantially increase the subsidy to
councils or, failing that, transfer the dispute resolution function back to the CCMA.
1.7   Exemptions
A number of changes were introduced to the new LRA to deal with the problems around
exemptions that had emerged under the old Act. First, as discussed above, a bargaining
council agreement cannot be extended unless the Minister is satisfied that provision is made 
in the agreement for an independent body to hear appeals against the refusal by the council
of a non-party’s application for exemption or the withdrawal of an exemption by the council.
The intention of this change is to restrict the involvement of the council itself in the exemption 
procedure, thereby making the process more impartial. It is interesting to note that in its
original form the new LRA provided that a council needed an independent body to hear all
applications for exemption (and not just appeals). This was amended in 1998 to limit the role
of the independent exemptions body to appeals only. The pressure for the change
apparently came from bargaining councils, because they found the need for an independent
body for all applications onerous and expensive.  
The second change in the new LRA is that a bargaining council agreement cannot be
extended by the Minister unless he/she is satisfied that the agreement contains criteria that
must be applied by the independent body when it considers an appeal, and that those
criteria are fair and promote the primary objects of the Act. The intention of the change is to
introduce greater clarity and certainty regarding the standard against which exemption
applications are judged.  
Research by Holtzhausen and Mischke (2004: 62-64) indicates that bargaining councils
have introduced greater clarity regarding the criteria for exemptions and in some cases a
more rigorous process to evaluate applications. Importantly, the criteria of some councils
now explicitly include the size of the firm and whether it is a new firm. But long lists of criteria
raise the question of how a council balances the various criteria in assessing an application
for exemption. While the list of criteria give a small business greater clarity on the standards
against which its application will be judged, such a list still leaves a lot of room for
interpretation by the council or its exemptions sub-committee. So, there are still questions
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about how the councils interpret the exemption criteria, what the impact has been of the
independent appeals committee, whether more exemptions are now being granted, and
what small firms think of the new system. 
Finally, section 30(1)(k) requires that a bargaining council constitution must provide the
procedure for exemptions from collective agreements. This might clarify the procedure but it
is likely that it does little more than set out the basic framework.
1.8   Data Collected by the Department of Labour
The LRA requires bargaining councils to submit certain data to the Department of Labour. In
certain instances these requirements are stated explicitly (ss 49 and 54), in other instances
the Act states that the registrar can request information necessary to make a particular
decision (s 29(1) in respect of registration), and in other cases the requirement to submit
data is implied (s 32 in respect of the extension of agreements). 
Councils must therefore provide data in respect of representivity of the parties when
applying for registration of the council and when requesting the Minister to extend a
collective agreement. Application for registration is done on LRA Form 3.3, which requires
the applicant parties to provide the following information in order to assess the representivity
of the proposed council:
• The total number of employers within the proposed scope of the council
• The total number of employees within the proposed scope of the council
• The total number of employees within the proposed scope of the council employed
by the members of the party employers’ organisations
• The total number of employers within the proposed scope of the council that belong
to the party employers’ organisations
• The total number of employees within the proposed scope of the council that belong 
to the party trade unions.
An application for the extension of an agreement is done on LRA Form 3.5. The form
requires exactly the same information listed above to assess the representivity of the
parties. Similarly, a request to extend the period of, or renew, a collective agreement that has 
to be extended must also be accompanied by the above information (LRA Form 3.6). What is 
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interesting about these forms is that they require the total number of employers within the
council’s scope and they require the total number of employers within the scope that belong
to the party employers’ organisations. This allows the registrar to assess the representivity of 
the employers’ organisations based on the number of their members rather than on the
number of employees their members employ. Section 32 of the LRA, however, has not
included this measure in its test for representivity. 
A similar discrepancy occurs in respect of section 49. Section 49(2) requires that a
bargaining council that has an extended agreement must inform the registrar annually in
writing on a date determined by the registrar as to the number of employees who are:
• Covered by the collective agreement
• Members of the party trade unions 
• Employed by members of the party employers’ organisations.
Section 49(3) provides that the registrar can request from any council, within a specified
period, information regarding the number of employees who are:
• Employed within the registered scope of the council
• Members of the party trade unions
• Employed by members of the party employers’ organisations.
However, the two forms on which such information must be supplied (LRA Form 3.20A in
respect of section 49(2) and LRA Form 3.20 in respect of section 49(3)) require the same five 
pieces of information listed above, that is: 
• The total number of employers within the proposed scope of the council
• The total number of employees within the proposed scope of the council
• The total number of employees within the proposed scope of the council employed
by the members of the party employers’ organisations
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• The total number of employers within the proposed scope of the council that belong
to the party employers’ organisations
• The total number of employees within the proposed scope of the council that belong 
to the party trade unions.
So, again, the forms ask for information on the number of employers covered and number of
members of the party employers’ organisations, which the Act does not require. 
Finally, the 2002 amendment to the LRA introduced a requirement (in section 54(2)(f)) for
councils to provide the registrar with the following information:
• The number of employees that are employed by small enterprises within the scope
of the council and the number of employees of those enterprises who are members
of trade unions
• The number of employees employed by small enterprises that are covered by the
extension of an agreement (presumably this refers to the number of employees of
non-party small enterprises)
• The number of small enterprises that are members of the employers’ organisations
that are parties to the council; and
• The number of applications for exemptions received from small enterprises and the
number of applications that were granted and the number rejected.
Again, the form on which the data must be supplied (LRA Form 3.20B) goes beyond the
scope of the above section and asks for more information. It requests the above information
as well as:
• The total number of employers and employees within the scope of the council
• The number of small enterprises within the scope of the council
• The number of small enterprises covered by an extended agreement (presumably
this refers to the number of non-party small enterprises)
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• The number of employees of small enterprises that are members of the party
employers’ organisations
• The number of applications for exemption broken down into applications from
parties and non-parties, each of which is further broken down into six size
categories (based on number of employees) and indicating the number granted,
refused, and still under consideration.
• The number of seats allocated to small enterprises on the council and the total
number of seats on the council
• The number of seats allocated to small enterprises on the council’s exemptions
board and the total number of seats on the board
• The number of seats allocated to small enterprises on the boards of the council’s
funds and the total number of seats on these boards.
It is unclear for what purpose this data will be used. There is certainly nothing in the section
that indicates that the Minister will use this information to assess requests for extension of
agreements. But it is likely that the Minister will take this information into account when
considering a request for the extension of an agreement from a council that does not meet
the primary requirements in section 32. However, if the intention was that the Minister
exercise his/her discretion on the basis of this data then the Act should have made this
explicit.
Of course, there is a difference between what the LRA requires bargaining councils to submit 
to the registrar and what they actually do submit. Section 54(4) of the LRA gives the registrar
extensive powers to deal with defaulters. Such powers are obviously not required in order to
get the information needed for the registration of bargaining councils and the extension of
agreements. If the necessary information is not submitted in these cases the sanction is
simply not to grant the registration and the extension. With regard to the data required in
terms of sections 49 and 54, the registrar may:
• Conduct an inquiry into the affairs of the defaulting council
• Order the production of the council’s financial records and any other relevant
documents
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• Deliver a notice to the council requiring the council to comply with the provisions
concerned
• Compile a report on the affairs of the council
• Submit the report to the Labour Court in support of any application for the winding
up of the council. 
It is not known whether the registrar has ever invoked these powers in order to get
information.
The DoL was able to provide a reasonable amount of the data on bargaining councils. But
closer scrutiny of some of the data reveals some inconsistencies and gaps as well as some
out of date data. However, these are relatively minor points. The major problem regarding
this data is that it is not made easily accessible to the public. Much of this data is important for 
the debate on bargaining councils and their impact on the labour market. The Department
should be publishing it on a regular basis. 
  2. Research Findings: Bargaining Council Coverage and Representivity 
2.1   Bargaining Council Coverage
In the section below we deal with the coverage of bargaining councils. Our primary source of
data was the questionnaire survey sent out to all functioning private sector councils. Gaps in
the data were filled by information supplied by the DoL as well as data that we had gathered
when doing prior research. The data for most councils is up to date as at 2004 but there are a 
few councils for which we only have somewhat out-of-date data; in a few cases the data is as
old as 1999. These were councils that did not respond to the questionnaire and for which the 
DoL’s data is out of date. The reasons that the Department’s data is out-of-date is that these
councils either do not publish agreements in the Government Gazette or do not extend
agreements, which means they seldom submit representivity data to the DoL. However, it is
very unlikely that updated data for these councils would differ much from the ‘old’ data. If
there have been changes in the number of employers and employees in the last five years
they were almost certainly small. 
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All bargaining councils (i.e. including the public sector councils, the local government council 
and Transnet) cover 20.3 per cent of the total labour force (excluding only the Defence
Force) as estimated by the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in September 2004.17 The number of 
employees covered by extended agreements amounts to 2.9 per cent of the labour force.
However, this gives a somewhat incorrect picture because the coverage of bargaining
councils is being compared to employers, the self-employed and employees, including
many who fall outside of the range of occupations covered by bargaining council
agreements as well as employees in sectors such as the private household sector that are
unlikely to ever have collective bargaining or a bargaining council. In Table 1 we break down
bargaining council coverage into those sectors that have a bargaining council or that could
conceivably have a council, and we compare the figures with the LFS data for employees in
occupational categories 4-9, i.e. the occupational categories that generally would fall within
bargaining councils’ bargaining units. 
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17 Total employment minus the SADF was estimated as 11 595 477 by the September 2004 LFS. It should be noted
that this figure includes employers, the self-employed and informal employment.
Table 1: Bargaining Council Coverage by Main Industry Classification Using the LFS
September 2004
Industry classification Total employeesin grades 4-9     Bargaining councils
Registered
employees
Employees at 
 non-party firms
1. Agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing
Fishing
Grain Co-operative
2 516
8 006
385
  0
688 620 Total 10 522 (1.5%) 385 (0.06%)
2. Mining and quarrying 376 501 - - -
3. Manufacturing
Canvas (x2)
Chemical
Clothing
Diamond Cutting
Furniture (x6)
Jewellery
Leather
Metal & Engineering
New Tyre
Sugar
Textile
1 908
72 691
97 958
1 941
26 457
620
17 841
272 796
5 150
4 947
23 876
600
0
47 449
74
10 225
140
4 823
121 672
0
0
4 270
1 230 177 Total 526 185 (42.8%) 189 253 (15.4%)
4. Electricity, gas and
water supply 59 207 - - -
5. Construction
Building (x5)
Electrical
25 748
21 304
10 548
9 937
594 780 Total 47 052 (7.9%) 20 485 (3.4%)
6. Wholesale and
retail trade
Commercial Distrib.
Meat Trade
Motor
Restaurant & Catering
Tearoom
780
3 350
154 655
18 000
15 241
330
1 616
58 271
751
3 000
1 333 239 Total 192 026 (14.4%) 63 968 (4.8%)
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7. Transport, storage
and communication
Motor Ferry
Road Freight
SA Road Passenger
Transnet
1 200
71 628
28 800
184 488
300
40 973
12 972
0
397 669 Total 286 116 (71.9%) 54 245 (13.6%)
8. Financial
intermediation,
insurance,    real estate
and business services  
Contract Cleaning 10 543 1 290
671 601 Total 10 543 (1.6%) 1 290 (0.2%)
9. Community, social
and personal services
Entertainment
Hairdressing (x4)
Laundry (x2)
Local Government
Public Sector (x5)
3 700
7 789
2 110
196 000
1 075 969
2 157
2 924
713
0
0
1 890 157 Total 1 285 568 (68.0%) 5 794 (0.3%)
Overall totals 7 241 951** 48 bargainingcouncils        
2 358 012***
(32.6%)
335 420
(4.6%)
* The Electrical Bargaining Council falls into Construction (the contracting part) and the Wholesale and Retail Trade (the service part). For
convenience we have classified it under Construction. 
** The total employment figure includes only those working for someone else and earning remuneration in the following occupational
categories: Clerks, Service workers and shop and market sales workers, Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, Craft and related trades
workers, Plant and machine operators, Elementary occupations. This includes formal and informal employment (as defined by Statistics
SA). Excluded from the figures are the top three occupational categories as well as employment in private households, employment at
extraterritorial organisations and foreign governments, those respondents that could not be adequately specified, and those that were
unspecified. Also excluded is the SA Defence Force (it is not covered by the LRA). But it should be noted that the employment figure for
the Community, social and personal services sector is for the above six occupational categories as well as the Professionals and Technical 
and associate professionals categories. This is because the public service councils, which dominate this sector, include these
occupational categories in their bargaining units. 
# Employment figures are from the Labour Force Survey, September 2004.
## The figures in respect of bargaining councils are primarily from the survey of private sector councils. Gaps in the data were filled by
information supplied by the Department of Labour and by telephoning the relevant bargaining councils. It should be noted that the data
from the Department is not consistently up to date as at 2004. However, this is the case for only a few councils and in general such data is 
post-2000
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Table 1 shows that 32.6 per cent of all workers that are in occupational categories that would
normally be covered by collective bargaining are covered by bargaining councils. Only 4.6
per cent of such workers are employed at non-party employers, i.e. they are covered by the
extension of agreements.
Four of the nine major sectors of the economy have no bargaining council or the bargaining
councils cover an insignificant proportion of workers. A further two sectors (Construction,
Wholesale and Retail) have very low coverage by bargaining councils (less than 15 per cent
in both cases) and almost insignificant coverage by extended agreements (less than 5 per
cent in both cases). In only three cases do bargaining councils cover a significant proportion
of the sector (Manufacturing, Transport, and Community, etc. services), and in the latter two
cases it is mainly because of Transnet and the local government and pubic sector councils
that the coverage is significant. In the case of the Community services sector, the fact that
the public sector councils and local government council do not extend their agreements
means that coverage is fairly extensive but the number of workers covered by extended
agreements is insignificant.  
In only two sectors (i.e. Manufacturing and Transport – both of which are dominated by a
handful of large national councils) is coverage fairly extensive and the coverage by extended 
agreements is significant. And even in these cases employment at non-parties is less than
16 per cent of total coverage. 
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2.2   The Representivity of Bargaining Councils
The fact that bargaining councils do not cover a large proportion of the specified labour force
and that extended agreements cover only a very small proportion is an important finding. It
does not, however, mean that the issue of the representivity of bargaining councils is no
longer of importance. Within the areas and sub-sectors covered by bargaining councils the
question of representivity remains crucial. However, the data regarding overall coverage
does put this question into a reduced perspective. 
In Table 2 we provide representivity data for all functioning private sector councils, split into
three categories (i.e. large national and other large councils; regional councils and small
national councils; and, small regional and local councils). There are five sets of data in the
table which provide three measures of representivity. The five sets of data are total
employers, total employees, party employers, employees at party employers, and members
of party trade unions. The three measures of representivity are party employers as a
proportion of all registered employers, the number of (covered) employees at party
employers as a proportion of all (covered) employees, and members of party trade unions as 
a proportion of all (covered) employees. As noted above, it is only the latter two measures
that are included in section 32 of the LRA regarding the extension of bargaining council
agreements. 
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Table 2 (a): Bargaining Council Representivity: Total for all Bargaining Councils
Bargaining
councils
Total
employers
Party
employers
Party e/ers as 
% of all e/ers
Total
employees
Employees of
party e/ers
Party e/er
employees as %
of all e/ees
Party union 
members
Party union
members as % of 
all e/ees
TOTAL 50 691 20 865 41 901 555 564 454 63 539 555 60
*** The Wood and Paper Sector bargaining council has not been counted in the total above as it was registered in 2005. It has 36 party employers of a total of 146 employers (25 per cent); the employer parties
employ 25 484 of 43 256 employees covered by the council (59 per cent); and, the party trade unions have 23 355 members (54 per cent). Note that the figures for total number of employers and total number of
employees are estimates made by the DoL registrar. 
Table 2 (b): Bargaining Council Representivity: Large National Councils and other Large Councils
Bargaining
councils
Total
employers Party employers
Party e/ers as
% of all e/ers Total employees
Employees of
party e/ers
Party e/er
employees as %
of all e/ees
Party union 
members
Party union
members as
% of all e/ees
Chemical 240* 240* 100 72 691* 72 691* 100 32 356 44
Clothing 1 175 329 28 97 958 50 509 52 71 239 73
Electrical 5 884 1 608 27 21 304 11 367 53 7 492 35
Leather 245 115 47 17 841 13 018 73 13 153 74
Metal &
Engineering 8 860 2 375 27 272 796 151 124 55 198 123 73
Motor 13 720 7 467 54 154 655 96 384 62 70 442 46
Road Freight 3 301 576 17 71 628 30 655 43 25 681 36
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SA Road
Passenger 180* 28* 16 28 800* 15 828* 55 13 457 47
Textile 137 66 48 23 876 19 606 82 18 466 77
TOTAL 33 742 12 804 38 761 549 461 182 61 450 409 59
* The Chemical Industry bargaining council has never had an extended agreement and therefore effectively does not have non-parties (although technically there are non-parties within its registered jurisdiction). We 
have counted only the party firms, their employees and party trade union members. The SA Road Passenger council has not had its main agreement extended and therefore also does not currently have non-parties. 
However, the council has in the past had its agreement extended and could again in future have its agreement extended, so we have included data for parties and non-parties.
Table 2 (c): Bargaining Council Representivity: Regional Councils and Small National Councils
Bargaining councils Totalemployers
Party
employers
Party e/ers as
% of all e/ers
Total
employees
Employees of 
party e/ers
Party e/er
employees as
% of all e/ees
Party union
members
Party union
members as 
% of all
e/ees
Building: Cape 1 311 244 19 14 672 7 719 53 7 356 50
Building: S&E Cape 600* 300* 50 6 800* 5 100* 75 2 200* 32
Contract Cleaning 227 70 31 10 543 9 253 88 5 284 50
Entertainment 785 159 20 3 700 1 543 42 1 850 50
Fishing 36 18 50 2 516 2 131 85 1 504 60
Furniture: KZN 291 94 32 4 806 3 413 71 2 663 55
Furniture: N Region 1 211 197 16 14 162 7 343 52 7 421 52
Furniture: W Cape 231 145 63 5 347 4 138 77 5 019 94
Grain Co-operative 9 9 100 8 006 8 006 100 6 250 78
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Hairdressing: Semi-Nat. 1 251 641 51 3 970 2 066 52 2 417 61
Meat Trade: Gauteng 863 466 54 3 350 1 734 52 2 054 61
New Tyre 6 6 100 5 150 5 150 100 4 852 94
Restaurant 5 500 4 091 74 18 000 17 249 96 14 885 83
Sugar 14 14 100 4 947 4 947 100 4 947 100
Tearoom: Pretoria 2 065 527 26 15 241 12 241 80 9 989 66
TOTAL 14 400 6 981 48 121 210 92 033 76 78 691 65
* The Building (Southern & Eastern Cape) bargaining council has not had a main agreement for some years. Therefore, strictly speaking, it does not have parties or non-parties. We have included it in the table
because the council still exists (having survived an application by the employer party to have it de-registered) and it seems that collective bargaining might still take place on the council. 
Table 2 (d): Bargaining Council Representivity: Small Regional and Local Councils
Bargaining councils Totalemployers
Party
employers
Party e/ers as
% of all e/ers
Total
employees
Employees of 
party e/ers
Party e/er
employees as 
% of all e/ees
Party union
members
Party union
members as % 
of all e/ees
Building: Bloemfontein 105 38 36 1 650 865 52 1 060 64
Building: Boland 375 133 35 2 200 1 247 57 1 398 64
Building: Kimberley 72 29 40 426 269 63 245 58
Canvas: Cape 22 18 82 1 082 894 83 270 25
Canvas: Wits &
Pretoria 65 35 54 826 414 50 414 50
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Commercial:
Kimberley 120 75 63 780 450 58 380 49
Diamond Cutting 52 40 77 1 941 1 867 96 860 44
Furniture: E Cape 52 12 23 588 424 72 358 61
Furniture: Free State 51 27 53 644 355 55 499 77
Furniture: SWD 59 45 76 910 559 61 715 79
Hairdressing: Cape 580 230 40 1 750 1 240 71 1 240 71
Hairdressing: KZN 212 81 38 719 437 61 437 61
Hairdressing: Pretoria 477 223 47 1 350 1 122 83 851 63
Jewellery: Cape 72 26 36 620 480 77 572 92
Laundry: Cape 105 33 31 1 273 758 60 719 56
Laundry: Natal 87 32 37 837 639 76 577 69
Motor Ferry 43 3 7 1 200 900 75 720 60
TOTAL 2 549 1 080 42 18 796 12 920 69 11 315 60
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The table shows that overall the private sector councils are representative on the two
measures in section 32 of the LRA. Party employers employ 63 per cent of all employees
covered by councils and 60 per cent of all employees covered by councils are members of
trade unions that are party to councils. But the system appears less representative when one 
considers the third measure, i.e. party employers as a proportion of all employers: only 41
per cent of employers are members of party employers’ organisations.18  
When one examines the three categories of council one finds that all are representative on
the two measures in section 32 of the LRA, but none of the categories are representative on
the third measure. However, it is significant that the large national council and other large
council category is even less representative on the latter measure than the overall figure (i.e. 
38 per cent as against 41 per cent). On the other hand, the regional council category is close
to representative on the third measure (48 per cent) and is very representative in terms of the 
two measures in section 32.  
Looking at the data in more detail one finds only two councils out of 41 that have less than 50
per cent representivity when one uses the employment by party employer measure (Road
Freight [ a large national council] and Entertainment [a small national council]). The trade
union membership measure is more problematic: there are nine councils that have less than
50 per cent representivity on this measure and a further four that are exactly on 50 per cent.
The large national and other large council category fares particularly badly on the latter
measure, accounting for five of the nine unrepresentative councils. 
Councils fare by far the worst on the third measure, i.e. members of party employers’
organisations as a proportion of all registered employers. In the latter case 24 bargaining
councils are less than 50 per cent representative, and in a number of cases representivity on 
this measure falls well below 50 per cent (e.g. there are 11 bargaining councils that have
employers’ organisations that represent fewer than 30 per cent of all registered employers).
Again, the large national and other large council category features prominently: seven of the
nine councils in this category are unrepresentative on this measure. The small regional and
local council category is also significantly unrepresentative with regard to this measure, with
11 of 17 councils unrepresentative.
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18 Note that we are here referring to representivity purely in terms of whether the parties’ members make up 50 per
cent or more of the employers. CCMA decisions with respect to organisational rights make it clear that
representivity is not just a question of numbers. See discussion in footnote 10 above.
2.3   Bargaining Council Representivity and Size of Firms
When one puts together the results of the first measure, i.e. total employment by party
employers, with the results of the last measure, i.e. party employers as a proportion of all
employers, then one gets an indication that the employer side of many bargaining councils is 
made up of larger employers in employers’ organisations that are not representative of all
employers. One can examine this finding in more detail by looking at the average size of
party employers and non-party employers for each council, using the number of employees
as the size criterion.
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Table 3 (a): The Average Size of Party Firms, Non-Party Firms and all Registered Firms: All Bargaining Councils
Bargaining councils Average size of all registered firms Average size of party firms Average size of non-party firms
AVERAGE 18 27 11
* The Wood and Paper Sector bargaining council has not been included in the average as it was registered in 2005. The average size of all registered firms covered by the council is 296, with the average
size of party firms standing at 708 and non-party firms at 162.
Table 3 (b): The Average Size of Party Firms, Non-Party Firms and All Registered Firms: Large National and Other Large Councils
Bargaining councils Average size of all registered firms Average size of party firms Average size of non-party firms
Chemical 303 n/a n/a
Clothing 83 153 56
Electrical 4 7 2
Leather 73 113 37
Metal & Engineering 31 64 19
Motor 11 13 9
Road Freight 22 53 15
i0SA Road Passenger 160 565 85
Textile 174 297 60
AVERAGE 23 36 14
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Table 3 (c): The Average Size of Party Firms, Non-Party Firms and all Registered Firms: Regional Councils and Small National Councils
Bargaining councils Average size of all registered firms Average size of party firms Average size of non-party firms
Building: Cape 11 32 7
Building: S&E Cape 11 17 6
Contract Cleaning 46 132 8
Entertainment 5 10 3
Fishing 70 118 21
Furniture: KZN 17 36 7
Furniture: N Region 12 37 7
Furniture: W Cape 23 29 14
Grain Co-operative 890 n/a n/a
Hairdressing: Semi-Nat. 3 3 3
Meat Trade: Gauteng 4 4 4
New Tyre 858 n/a n/a
Restaurant 3 4 1
Sugar 353 n/a n/a
Tearoom: Pretoria 7 23 2
AVERAGE 8 13 4
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Table 3 (d): The Average Size of Party Firms, Non-Party Firms and all Registered Firms: Small Regional and Local Councils
Bargaining councils Average size of all registered firms Average size of party firms Average size of non-party firms
Building: Bloemfontein 16 23 12
Building: Boland 6 9 4
Building: Kimberley 6 9 4
Canvas: Cape 49 50 47
Canvas: Wits & Pretoria 13 12 14
Commercial: Kimberley 7 6 7
Diamond Cutting 37 47 6
Furniture: E Cape 11 35 4
Furniture: Free State 13 13 12
Furniture: SWD 15 12 25
Hairdressing: Cape 3 5 2
Hairdressing: KZN 3 5 2
Hairdressing: Pretoria 3 5 1
Jewellery: Cape 9 19 3
Laundry: Cape 12 23 7
Laundry: Natal 10 20 4
Motor Ferry 28 300 8
AVERAGE 7 12 4
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The table confirms that in the case of the vast majority of councils the party firms are larger
on average than the non-party firms, with the result that the overall average size of party
firms is larger than non-party firms. However, the average size of party firms (27 employees)
it not that much bigger than party firms (11 employees). In fact, the average sizes of all firms,
party firms and non-party firms are relatively small. This is an important finding: when looking 
at the average sizes the bargaining council system is by and large a regulator of fairly small
firms. 
Breaking the data down into the three categories of council produces an interesting result. It
appears that the smaller the council the smaller the average firm size. While the average
size difference is marginal between the regional and small national council category and the
small regional and local council category, the difference is more marked in respect of the
large national and other large council category. When one examines that data in more detail
the reason for this becomes clearer. The average size of party firms at many of the large
councils is significantly bigger than in the other categories. It is only councils that cover
sectors in which small and micro firms predominate, such as the Motor Council and the
Electrical Council, that the average size of party firms is small and there is little difference in
the average size of party and non-party firms. At the remaining councils in this category the
average size of party firms is much bigger and there is a significant difference in the average
size of party and non-party firms.
There are also substantial differences in the average size of party and non-party firms in the
regional and small national council category but this is the case for only two councils. At
almost all the other councils the differences are not great and firms are generally fairly small.
This is even more so the case for the small regional and local council category, with the
exception of the Motor Ferry Council.
2.4   DoL Data on Small Business Representation on Councils
Data supplied for the DoL provides further insight on the issue of small businesses covered
by councils and their representation. The data must be treated with caution. There are a
number of gaps in the data supplied by the DoL and some councils on the original table have
been left out because the data was incomplete or did not make sense. There are a few more
obvious questions that one can raise about the data. For example, how is it possible for
councils to supply data on small businesses within their jurisdictions when they do not
appear to have defined a small business? The data on the number of seats on councils
raises another question: it is not always clear whether councils are providing figures for all
seats (i.e. employer and trade union seats) or whether the figures are for the employer seats
only. 
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In Table 4 we provide the data broken down into the three categories of bargaining councils.
Table 4(a): Department Of Labour Data On Representation of Small Firms on Bargaining Councils: Large National and other Large 
Bargaining council Definition of smallfirm Total small firms
Employees of
small firms
% of small firms
that are parties
% of small firm 
non-parties
% party union
members at small
firms
Small firm 
seats on
council
Electrical Not provided 1 755 6 061 47 53 73 14 of 27
Motor 10 or less employees 12 085 52 572 31 69 12 1 of 4
Road Freight 2 or less drivers 932 874 3 97 83 1 of 12
Textile 15 or less employees 13 127 8 92 24 2 of 22
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Table 4 (b): Department Of Labour Data on Representation of Small Firms on Bargaining Councils: Regional and Small National Councils
Bargaining council Definition of smallfirm Total small firms
Employees of
small firms
% of small
firms that are
parties
% of small firm
non-parties
% party union
members at
small firms
Small firm
seats on
council
Building: Cape 5 or less employees 630 1 707 5 95 12 8 of 16
Building: S&E Cape 5 or less employees 200 1 000 50 50 50 2 of 8
Contract Cleaning 50 or less employees 173 807 76 24 n/a 2 of 6
Entertainment Less than 10employees 785 3 700 20 80 50 4 of 12
Fishing 20 or less employees 12 188 25 75 40 2 of 10
Furniture: KZN NSB Act definition 244 2 468 30 70 35 3 of 9
Furniture: N Region 10 or less employees 825 2 064 10 90 9 1 of 9
Furniture: W Cape 3 or less employees 36 81 64 36 88 1 of 10
Hairdressing:
Semi-nat 10 or less employees 1 019 2 697 50 50 47 6 of 8
Meat Trade: Gauteng 50 or less employees 853 2 337 54 46 73 3 of 15
Restaurant 7 or less employees 1 751 6 163 32 68 4 0 of 10
Tearoom: Pretoria Not provided 2 065 15 241 26 74 80 12 of 12
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Table 4(c): Department of Labour Data on Representation of Small Firms on Bargaining Councils: Small Regional and Local Councils
Bargaining council Definition of smallfirm Total small firms
Employees of
small firms
% of small
firms that are
parties
% of small
firm
non-parties
% party union members 
at small firms
Small firm
seats on
council
Building: Bloem 10 or less employees 72 576 21 79 n/a 0 of 6
Building: Boland Not provided 43 1 900 44 66 68 2 of 4
Building: E London* 5 or less employees 40 130 95 5 46 1 of 8
Building: Kimberley 10 or less employees 40 190 28 72 14 1 of 6
Canvas Goods Less than 10employees 13 71 54 46 51 0 of 8
Diamond Cutting Not provided 36 274 69 31 n/a 0 of 4
Furniture: E Cape 5 or less employees 59 420 20 80 0 n/a
Laundry: Cape No clear definition 106 1 257 31 69 64 5 of 10
Laundry: KZN No clear definition 86 594 35 65 52 0 of 6
Meat Trade: E Londn* 7 or less employees 4 17 100 0 n/a 0 of 8
Motor Ferry Not yet defined 40 200 0 100 n/a n/a
* The Building (East London) and Meat Trade (East London) are included in the DoL data but were not included in the survey conducted by ourselves. The latter council was found to be defunct while the former has to 
all intents and purposed merged with the Building (S & E Cape) bargaining council (its data was incorporated into the latter council’s data).  
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What is somewhat surprising about the data in Table 4 is that it shows that relatively large
numbers of small firms covered by bargaining councils are members of the party employers’
organisation(s). At 11 out of 27 bargaining councils more than 40 per cent of small firms were 
members of the party employers’ organisation(s) and at nine councils between 21 per cent to 
40 per cent of the small firms were members. At only three councils were 5 per cent or less
small firms members of the party employers’ organisations. This suggests that many small
firms are participating in the system rather than just registering with the council (with the
caveat that the figures reflect registered small firms only). What makes the finding even
more significant is that in general bargaining councils define small firms as very small, i.e.
the majority of councils have adopted a definition of 10 or less employees.
The DoL has data for four of the councils in the large national and other large council
category. At one of these councils more than 40 per cent of small firms were members of the
party employers’ organisation and at another 31 per cent of small firms were members of the
party employers’ organisation. At a third, less than 5 per cent of small firms were members of 
the party employers’ organisation. In the regional and small national councils category, on
the other hand, at five of the 12 councils over 40 per cent of small firms were members of the
party employers organisation, and a further four were in the 21 per cent to 40 per cent range.
The small regional and local council category has a similar breakdown: at five of the 11
councils over 40 per cent of small firms were members of the party employers organisation,
and a further four councils were in the 21 per cent to 40 per cent range. The finding suggests
that there is greater representation of smaller firms on the employer side of smaller councils.
The data is also surprising in that it shows that small firms are generally well organised by
party trade unions. At 13 of the 27 councils, party trade union membership at small firms
exceeded 40 per cent. At three other councils party trade union membership was in the 21
per cent to 40 per cent range. Trade union membership at registered small firms therefore
appears to be relatively healthy. This undermines somewhat the argument by some small
firms that they should not have bargaining council agreements extended to them as they are
not members of the employers’ organisation and few or none of their employees are
organised by party trade unions. While this might be true for the employer it does not appear
to be true in about half the cases for the employees. Again, however, one needs to
emphasise that the figures reflect trade union membership at registered small firms only. If
unregistered small firms could somehow be included, the findings might change
significantly. 
Unlike with the representation of small firms by employers’ organisations, there is a fairly
even spread across the three categories of councils in terms of high levels of party union
membership at small firms. Two of the four large national councils had party union
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membership in the over 40 per cent range and one was in the 21 per cent to 40 per cent
range. In the regional and small national council the breakdown was respectively six and
two, and in the small regional and local council category it was five and zero
The table also gives detailed data regarding seats allocated to small business
representatives. As noted above, there are some question marks over this data.
Furthermore, it requires more qualitative research to go beyond these figures and
understand whether these seats actually translate into power in negotiations that would
result in some accommodation of small businesses.
2.5   Qualitative Interviews Regarding Small Business Representation
In order to go beyond this quantitative representation of the composition of bargaining
councils by size of firm, we conducted a short qualitative interview at nine bargaining
councils in order to understand what the dynamics are between large and small firms.19 The
majority of the councils are large national councils and most of the other councils are in the
regional and small national council category.20  
Of the nine councils only one, the Metal and Engineering Bargaining Council had member
employers’ organisations that specifically represent small businesses. At six of the
remaining councils, however, the employers had nominated one or two of the employer
representatives to specifically represent small business interests on the council. But at one
of the latter councils the employers had indicated that all the representatives represented
small business (contrary to the council’s constitution which required only one to be
nominated for this purpose).
Generally, the councils indicated that the small business representatives did actually try to
represent small business interests, and in most cases the representation was seen as
effective. But in some cases this view was qualified, in that although the representative(s)
did their best to raise small business concerns they were in all cases in the minority, and
were often outvoted. Only one bargaining council indicated that the representation was not
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19 It should be noted that in some cases the respondent at the council completed and returned the interview schedule 
without an interview actually taking place. In such cases, follow-up calls were made if any information was unclear.
20 The nine bargaining councils were Metal and Engineering, Contract Cleaning, SA Road Passenger, Road Freight, 
Clothing, Textile,  Building (Cape), Furniture (E Cape), and Furniture (N Region).
effective (this is the same council at which all the employer representatives had indicated
that they represented small business).
Interviewees were asked whether there were any ways in which small business could be
more effectively represented. Three councils did not see that such representation could be
made more effective. Two councils believed that small business representation could not be
more effective because small businesses could not organise themselves and commit time to 
participation in the bargaining council. Two councils were more optimistic in that they felt that 
if small businesses did organise themselves (in the case of the Metal and Engineering
council into a strong national body) they would more effectively represent themselves. One
other council provided a number of suggestions as to how small businesses could be
represented:
• There must be a compulsory minimum of one employer and one employee
representative on councils to represent small businesses
• The DoL needs to conduct an annual survey of small businesses to identify their
needs and problems regarding bargaining councils
• Recognition needs to be given to the number of small businesses represented by
employers’ organisations rather than how many employees the members employ
• The thresholds (employee numbers or percentages) for admitting new employers’
organisation parties should be removed as these are barriers to small business
representation 
• A bargaining council’s definition of small, medium and micro businesses should be
reviewed annually by DoL
• Bargaining councils should submit an annual report to DoL on positive steps taken
to include and accommodate small businesses in their main agreements
• The extension of a bargaining council agreement should be dependant on
complying with the above to the satisfaction of the Minister
Councils were then asked what the big businesses on councils could do to better
accommodate small business interests. Almost all the councils indicated that there was
nothing more that big businesses could do, or that big business had already accommodated
small business to the extent possible (or to the extent that there were no longer tensions
between big and small businesses). In the case of six councils the factor motivating the
Conditions of Employment and Small Business: Coverage, Compliance and Exemptions
 41 
above answer was that some form of blanket exemption or special exemption procedure had 
been introduced to accommodate small businesses. For example, the Metal and
Engineering Bargaining Council had made provision for a wage relief exemption, a special
exemption for small and struggling businesses, and an expedited exemption procedure for
small businesses. In addition, the parties to the council had undertaken to streamline the
exemption process further and set up a special, simple and expedited wage exemption
process for small business based on the employment size and annual turnover of the
business.
The Furniture Bargaining Council (Northern Region) has introduced a sophisticated blanket
exemption for newly established businesses that have 10 or less employees. There are four
phases to the process which see qualifying firms phasing in to full compliance over about a
three year period. The process does not exclude individual applications for exemption,
which means that a firm could extend the period of the phase-in on application. The council
believe that this is responsible for defusing almost all tensions between small businesses
and the council. Two other councils came to much the same conclusion because they had
introduced blanket exemptions for firms with 5 or less employees.
It was noted above that only one of the nine councils currently has a party employers’
organisation that specifically represents small businesses. It was also mentioned that a
number of interviewees believed that small business representation could not be more
effective because they did not have the time to organise themselves properly and represent
their interests. We asked councils whether they were aware of small business employers’
organisations in their sectors, and if there were such organisations, why they had not joined
the council.
Five councils were aware of some other employers’ organisation(s) organising in their
sectors, although one understood that the organisation did not specifically represent small
businesses. One council did not know why the employers’ organisation in question had not
joined the council. Another attributed the organisation’s failure to join the council to the
perception that the bargaining council was only for big business. Yet another attributed this
to the admission thresholds of the council, which were too high, particularly since it is very
difficult to organise small businesses.21 Significantly, all the interviewees that were aware of
some other employers’ organisation in their sector believed that these organisations would
improve small business representation on the council, notwithstanding their lack of
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21 The threshold was keeping at least one employers’ organisation that represented small businesses out of the
council.
experience of collective bargaining and the fact that some had acrimonious relations with the 
existing employer parties.
2.6   Non-Compliance (i.e. Non-Registration)
Bargaining council officials were asked to estimate the extent of non-registration by
employers within the council’s jurisdiction, i.e. the number of firms falling within the council’s
jurisdiction that were not registered with the council and the number of employees that such
firms employed in total. Of the 29 councils, ten did not answer the question. The main
reasons appeared to be that the council official felt that they could not even hazard a guess
at making such an estimate or that there could not be any unregistered firm because if they
knew about such firms then they would go out and register them. 
Table 5 sets out the estimates of the 19 councils that did venture an answer regarding the
proportion of unregistered employers and employees at unregistered firms – with the
estimates provided by councils in the large national and other large council category
separated out in columns three and five.
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Table 5: Estimates of Proportion of Unregistered Employers and Employees
Unregistered employers or
employees as a proportion of
registered employers or
employees
Number of bargaining
councils: Estimate for
employers
Number of councils in large
national category: Estimate for
employers
Number of bargaining
councils: Estimate for
employees
Number of councils in
large national category:
Estimate for employees
Less than 5% 5 2 8 2
5% to 19% 4 0 5 1
20% to 39% 5 1 4 1
40% to 99% 4 1 1 0
100% or more 1 0 1 0
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Five of the 19 councils indicated that the number of unregistered employers amounted to
less than 5 per cent of the number of registered employers; and eight councils stated that the 
number of employees at unregistered firms amounted to less than 5 per cent of all
employees with registered firms. Two of the four large national or other large councils fell into 
this category. For all these councils the level of unregistered employers and employees did
not appear to be a significant issue. 
For a number of councils the level of non-registration was more of a problem. Ten councils
estimated that the proportion of unregistered employers to registered employers was 20 per
cent or higher (two of these were large national councils), with one council estimating that
there were more unregistered employers than there were registered employers. Six councils 
estimated that the proportion of employees at unregistered firms compared to total
employees at registered firms was 20 per cent or higher (one large national council was in
this category).22  For those councils that made estimates in the 40 per cent and above range, 
non-registration has become a major problem and arguably threatens their existence.
A second way in which one might try to measure the number of unregistered firms is to
compare the coverage of individual bargaining councils with LFS data for the same sector
and area. However, one can do such an exercise for only a few councils. Many councils are
excluded because Statistics SA provide data down to only the SIC three-digit level. Most
other councils are excluded because their area is defined by magisterial districts whereas
the LFS data is based on 52 municipal districts. So one cannot match the area and scope of
most councils to an equivalent LFS area and scope in order to compare the bargaining
council coverage with the LFS employment data. 
Ultimately we were able to do the exercise for only three councils, viz. the clothing
bargaining council, the textile bargaining council and the General Goods and Tanning
sub-sectors within the leather bargaining council.23 These were the only councils that are
national (therefore excluding the problem of magisterial districts and municipal districts) and
could be matched closely to an SIC sector or sub-sector. But it is probably not an exact
match so the comparison should be treated with caution. In fact, the exercise probably does
not give one a better estimate than those made by council officials above.
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22 The higher number of estimates of non-compliant employers compared to non-compliant employees within each
range is indicative of the fact that non-compliant employers are generally small or very small.
23 The councils are not representative: all are national councils, all are in the broadly defined textile, clothing and
leather sector, and all are in industries that are under tremendous pressure from imports.
The clothing bargaining council covered 97 958 employees in 2004, of whom 47 449 were
employed by non-party employers (i.e. they were covered by the extension of the
agreement). These are employed in what Statistics SA would define as occupational
categories 4 to 9. The LFS estimate of employment in the clothing industry in these
categories is 129 417.24 If one accepts the LFS estimate then it means that in the clothing
industry the bargaining council actually regulates conditions for only 97 958 of the 129 417
employees in the industry (76 per cent), while the remaining 31 459 employees (24 per cent)
are employed by unregistered employers.25 
Employer parties on the bargaining council currently represent 52 per cent of the industry if
one counts the number of their employees as a proportion of all (registered) employees (i.e.
50 509 employees out of 97 958). If one had to take account of the 31 459 employees that
work for unregistered employers (see above), the representivity of the employer parties
would drop to 39 per cent (i.e. the employer parties would employ 50 509 of 129 417
employees (39 per cent) rather than 50 509 of 97 958 employees (52 per cent)). In other
words, 61 per cent of employees in the industry would be at non-party firms (including
unregistered firms) rather than the current 48 per cent. So counting all the employees at
unregistered firms would considerably alter the representivity of the council. Not counting
them means that the representivity of the council is adequate but there are a large number of 
employees (and employers) outside the council that undermine the conditions it sets.
The textile bargaining council covered 23 876 emloyees in 2004, of whom 4 270 were
employed by non-party employers. These are employed in occupational categories 8 to 9
(as used by Statistics SA). The LFS estimate of employment in the textile industry in these
categories is 43 989.26 This means that the textile industry bargaining council actually
regulates conditions for 54 per cent of employees and the remaining 46 per cent are
employed at unregistered employers (again with the proviso that one needs to be cautious
with regard to the match of the LFS scope with the scope of the council).27
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24 SIC code 314.
25 This compares to an estimate by the respondent at the council that the number of employees that were employed
at unregistered firms amounted to 10 per cent of all employees.
26 SIC codes 311, 312, 313 and 336.
27 This compares to an estimate by the respondent at the council that the number of employees that were employed
at unregistered firms amounted to 23 per cent of all employees.
Employer parties on the bargaining council currently represent 82 per cent of the industry if
one counts the number of their employees as a proportion of all (registered) employees. If
one had to take account of the 20 113 employees that work for unregistered employers, the
representivity of the employer parties would drop to 46 per cent. In other words, 54 per cent
of employees in the industry would be at non-party firms (including unregistered firms) rather 
than the current 18 per cent. 
We could not do the above exercise for the leather bargaining council as a whole because
the footwear sector, which is the most important sector, does not yet cover what were the
TBVC states. Only the Tanning sector and General Goods sectors cover the entire country.
Fortunately, we were able to match these sectors with SIC sectors.28 The bargaining council
covers 6 832 employees in occupational categories 7 to 9 in the tanning and general goods
sectors. The LFS employment figure for these occupations in the two sectors is 17 353. This
means that the leather industry bargaining council actually regulates conditions for 39 per
cent of employees in the tanning and general goods sectors. The remaining 61 per cent are
employed at unregistered firms. Again, we caution against using this data as anything more
then a rough indicator. 
We do not have data on the number of employees at party and non-party firms in the tanning
and general goods sectors, so we cannot work out what the impact on representivity would
be if unregistered firms were included in the calculation. It would seem, however, that given
the number of unregistered employees there would be a quite substantial impact.  
Clearly, the above figures, including the estimates made by council officials, must be treated
with caution. However, one can at least argue on the basis of the above that the level of
non-registration at a number of bargaining councils is significant, and that this poses a threat 
to those councils. At the very least, taking account of employees at unregistered firms would
lower the representivity of many councils. 
Of course, the above raises the question of how DoL evaluate the representivity of parties to
councils. The LRA sets two quantitative representivity requirements for the extension of
agreements. Strictly speaking such requirements should be assessed by calculating
representivity with respect to all employees within the jurisdiction of the council (and not just
employees at registered firms). Officials of the DoL state that this is indeed the way they
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interpret the requirements. But how does one make such a calculation if one does not know
how many employees there are within the jurisdiction of the council? 
The answer it seems is with great difficulty and not much accuracy. There are various
databases that the DoL can use (the UIF register, the Compensation Commissioners’
register, the relevant SETA’s database, and Statistics SA’s Labour Force Survey) but all
define sectors and areas in different ways, none of which necessarily correspond with the
way that a bargaining council defines the sector and area it covers. So the DoL makes
recourse to such databases but generally they are not found to be very useful. At best they
give only a rough guide. The alternative is to get the parties to name non-complying firms
and also to rely on objections (to an extension) from other non-party organisations that might 
indicate numbers of non-complying firms. Such names can then be fed back to the council
with the request that they do a verification exercise to establish how many unregistered firms 
do in fact fall within the jurisdiction of the council and how many employees they employ.29
This is a pragmatic way of going about the exercise but is does not come near to solving the
problem. 
To a certain extent the difficulty of calculating the number of unregistered firms creates an
incentive for the parties to councils not to identify unregistered firms. If they do, they reduce
their representivity. And where councils do register previously unregistered firms, it is very
unlikely that the firm will then join the party employers’ organisation, which means that the
number of non-party employers and employees will increase and the representivity of the
parties will go down. Of course, there is a countervailing incentive for the parties to councils
to bring unregistered firms within the ambit of the council, namely to eliminate unfair
competition from non-complying firms and to extend the council’s employment conditions to
the workers in such firms. 
It is unknown whether councils act on the incentive to not register unregistered firms. A far
more practical explanation for large numbers of unregistered firms is the capacity of councils 
to undertake the tracking and registration of such firms. In other words, if the council has
limited enforcement capacity then this would account for the fact that not much effort is put
into finding and registering such firms (or even having a rough idea as to how many
unregistered firms there could be). This is discussed in more detail below.
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29 An interviewee at DoL used the recent controversy over the request from the Clothing bargaining council to extend 
its agreement to illustrate the problem and how DoL sought to find a solution.
2.7   Benefit Funds, Services and Wage Levels
There are four main ways that councils can make inroads into the level of non-registration.
First, the council can seek to enforce its agreements more effectively (see further below).
Second, the council can offer a range of benefits and services that would attract firms to
register. Third, the council could seek to produce agreements that did not threaten the
viability of small and new firms. Or agreements which at least better accommodated the
problems faced by small and new firms. This could be by way of lower minimum wages, etc.
It could also be by way of a blanket exemption for small and new firms. The latter is
discussed further in the section on exemptions below. Finally, a fair and transparent
exemption system could also go some way to reducing non-compliance because firms might 
then choose the option of registering and applying for exemption rather than exempting
themselves by not complying. As mentioned above, we discuss exemptions in more detail
below.
In the sections that follow we shall discuss the option of benefits and services to attract firms
to register as well as, to some extent, the option of lower minimum conditions (focussing on
wages).
2.7.1   Benefit and Other Funds
Benefit funds have long been a key aspect of bargaining councils. Many of the funds appear
to be relatively cheap and are therefore an important attraction for employers and
employees to be registered with the council (although they also add to the cost of labour and
are therefore seen as onerous by some employers). They can also be used as a way of
raising the representivity of the parties, i.e. if the parties allow only their members to join the
benefit funds then it is a way of recruiting members and keeping up representivity (although
it seems that not many councils have adopted this stratagem). Of course, if the latter route is
chosen by a council it probably reduces the incentive of the benefit funds for unregistered
employers because in order to access the fund the employer would have to both register
with the council and join a party employers’ organisation. 
Pension/Provident funds were the most prevalent benefit funds administered by councils. Of 
the 29 councils, 20 had a pension or provident fund or both. Five of the seven large national
councils had provident and/or pension funds. The next most prevalent funds were sick pay
and sick benefit funds (although it was not always clear from answers whether the council
had one or both types). Ten councils had sick benefit funds (i.e. a form of medical aid) while
nine had sick pay funds (which provide pay for sick leave). Four of the large national councils 
had sick pay or sick benefit funds. Generally employers would see such funds as an
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attraction because in the absence of such a fund the employer would be liable for sick pay in
terms of the BCEA.
Seven councils had holiday pay funds, which provide for holiday pay over the annual
shutdown period (in most cases it seems that the fund also provides for some form of annual
bonus). As with sick pay, such funds place much the same obligation on employers as would
be imposed on them by the BCEA. However, what such funds do is spread the cost of
holiday pay across the year and also guarantee that workers will get their pro rata holiday
pay should the employer go out of business. In addition, the holiday fund can provide some
sort of annual bonus as well. None of the large national councils had holiday pay funds.
A few councils had other funds. These ranged from funeral funds (four councils) to death
benefit funds (although most Pension and Provident funds probably include some form of
death benefit) to funds for housing loans (three councils), and unemployment (one council).
In total, the 29 bargaining councils provided for 59 benefit funds. The seven large national
councils accounted for 11 funds in total.
Provision of benefit funds are clearly an important function of bargaining councils. They can
assist the bargaining council to attract employers and also reduce the burden on the state
with regard to health and retirement provision. They are also one way that many small firms
can provide such benefits to employees which they would not have been able to do on their
own. Councils should therefore be given support with regard to benefit funds. A change to
the LRA in 1998 appears to have made things difficult for councils regarding benefit funds. 
Sections 28(2) and (3) now provide that bargaining council funds must comply with “the
provisions of the laws relating to pension, provident or medical aid schemes or funds”. It was
outside the scope of this study to examine the impact of this change on councils’ benefit
funds but anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases councils have struggled to meet
this requirement. However, it is an area that requires more research.
2.7.2   Services Provided by Councils
Another way that councils can attract firms to register is to provide services to the firms that
they find of value. It seems, however, that most councils have been lax in this area. Eleven of 
the 29 bargaining councils that responded to the questionnaire provided no services at all,
including three of the seven large national councils. The most prevalent service was advice
to employers regarding labour legislation, the council’s agreements, disciplinary
procedures, etc. A total of 14 councils provided such a service, although it should be noted
that for six councils this was the only service they provided (including one of the large
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national councils). So 17 of the 29 councils either provided no services or were limited to only 
paralegal-type advice regarding labour law (the 17 councils included four of the seven large
national councils).
Only a few councils had expanded the range of services beyond paralegal advice. Some
offered various forms of training while others provided information on the industry and
topical issues, either through websites or newsletters or information meetings/seminars (or
some combination of these). Two councils assisted with disciplinary hearings at firms by
chairing such meetings on request, and two councils acted as employment bureaux by
keeping a register of the unemployed in the sector and making this available to employers
who were seeking to recruit more workers. One council also acted as a conduit for various
discounted services, i.e. registered paid-up firms could access certain services at a discount 
from service providers with which the council had established an arrangement. Another
council provided registered firms with brochures that advertised cheaper raw materials.
One council had introduced an important service for businesses, which would be particularly 
useful for small businesses, although it was not a free service. The council provided full
payroll administration, which means that a business could provide the council with its wage
records and the council would process the records into wage packets reflecting all the
necessary deductions to SARS, UIF, the Compensation Commissioner and, of course, the
council itself. The business would get back the wage packets and would have to make up the 
actual wages and then pay lump sums to SARS, etc. The cost of the service varies according 
to whether the business paid workers weekly or fortnightly and whether businesses had
more than 50 employees or less. But the cost is not high: a business with 50 or less
employees would pay a flat rate of R206.50 per week for the service.
It is evident that the notion of councils as a service provider to the industry, beyond its
traditional role as a collective bargaining and dispute settlement forum, is not well
developed. It is an area where much could be done to make councils a more attractive
feature of the industry, providing services that at least in part off-set the cost of compliance
for small and micro firms. This is true for the smaller regional and local councils as well as
some of the large national councils
One service which most councils now provide in terms of the new LRA is dispute resolution,
in the form of either conciliation or conciliation and arbitration. In order to provide this service
the council needs to be accredited by the CCMA. In 2004 there were 55 councils accredited
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for conciliation and 35 councils accredited for conciliation and arbitration.30 Councils appear
to set much store by providing dispute resolution services but these are not without their
cost. It is generally agreed that the subsidy paid to councils for the provision of the service is
woefully inadequate to cover the actual costs to the council. While this can be partially off-set 
by using council agents as the conciliators and arbitrators, this option reduces the capacity
of the council to enforce its agreements.
2.7.3   Minimum Wage Levels
The minimum wage levels set by councils are probably the most difficult aspect of the
bargaining council system for small business. We have not examined this issue in great
detail as it is complex. However, we sought information from councils with regard to two
aspects of wages that indicate an attempt by councils to accommodate different
circumstances as well as small businesses. The first was whether there was some form of
wage differentiation, i.e. different wage rates for different regions covered by the councils to,
for example, provide lower wages for firms in rural areas. The second was the wage rate of
the lowest paid job category. We used two sources for this part of the study, namely the
questionnaires to councils and the Labour Research Service’s database on wage rates
(AWARD). 
According to the latter database, which provides information on the wages rates of 31
bargaining councils, there are 12 councils that have some form of wage differentiation. The
most prevalent type of differentiation is by region. At its simplest this differentiation involves
two wage schedules: one for firms in specified urban areas and one for firms in rural or other
areas. However, some councils have more sophisticated wage systems. For example, the
Electrical Bargaining Council (one of the large national councils) has 12 sets of regional
wage rates and the Building Bargaining Council (Southern & Eastern Cape) has five sets of
regional wage rates. The National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Industry (also one of
the large national councils), formed out of a merger of a number of regional councils, has an
even more sophisticated system of wage differentiation. This differentiates between five
main regions, but there is further differentiation within some of these regions on a
sub-sectoral basis (i.e. different sets of wage rates for the clothing, knitting and millinery
sub-sectors) or on a regional basis (i.e. the Eastern Cape region has five different sets of
wage rates for different areas within the region). 
DPRU Working Paper 06/106                                          Shane Godfrey, Johann Maree and Jan Theron
 52 
30 CCMA Annual Report 2003/2004 at p. 23. It should be noted that the list of councils was compiled prior to the
merger of a number of councils to form the National Bargaining Council for the Textile Industry, so the numbers of
accredited councils are higher than would be the case at present.
Some councils such as the Bargaining Council for the Sugar Industry and the Grain
Co-operative Bargaining Council, neither of which cover non-parties, have an even more
decentralised system of wage schedules. The Sugar Bargaining Council has separate sets
of wages for most of the sugar mills that are party to the council. This is also the case for the
Grain Co-operative Bargaining Council, which has nine different sets of wages for each of its
employer members. Although the actual wage differential is small between the different
member firms, it nevertheless shows how flexible centralised bargaining can be. 
The questionnaires confirmed the broad pattern indicated by the LRS database (there was
considerable overlap between the councils in the LRS database and the councils that
completed questionnaires). Of the 29 councils that completed questionnaires, 13 had some
form of wage differentiation and one council did not set minimum wages. Of the 13 councils
that had wage differentiation, nine differentiated by region. In some cases the differentiation
was between only two regions but in other cases the there were different sets of wages for up 
to six regions. Four councils had some form of sub-sectoral wage differentiation.
As noted above, the differences in the wage rates at the bottom end of the wage schedule
were often quite small. Nevertheless, this does show that a large minority of councils are
attempting to accommodate differing sectoral and regional circumstances in their
agreements. It is arguable that more councils could be doing this. However, there are some
councils that have such small jurisdictions in terms of sector and region that it is
unnecessary to explore wage differentiation. 
According to the Labour Research Service (LRS), in 2004 the monthly income required by a
household to maintain a minimum living level (MLL) was R1 946. A higher income level, the
supplemented living level (SLL), was R2 549.(Elsley, 2005: 8) These translate into
respectively R449.42 and R588.68 per week. The LRS Report provides data on minimum
wages for the lowest-paid job category at 30 bargaining councils (in some cases further
broken down to take account of the regional or sub-sectoral differentiation).(Labour
Research Service, 2005: 42)  Only two of the councils had minimum wages above the SLL.
In both cases the councils had regional or sectoral differentiation, so not all the minimum
wages for each region or sector were above the SLL. At one council (the Leather Bargaining
Council) it was at only two sectors/regions out of five that the minimum wages exceeded the
SLL. At the other council (the Metal and Engineering Bargaining Council) three of the six
sectoral minimum wages exceeded the SLL (and one exceeded the MLL). 
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A further nine councils had wages that exceeded the MLL. As with the SLL, four of the nine
had some form of differentiation, which meant that not all of the differentiated minimum wages 
at these councils exceeded the MLL. Minimum wages for the lowest-paid category at the
remaining 19 bargaining councils were below the MLL. In some cases the minimum wages
rates were substantially below the MLL.
The above is a somewhat cursory examination of minimum wages rates set by bargaining
councils and clearly much more work needs to be done to get a clearer picture of this issue.
However, the findings indicate quite a clear trend, viz. that in general the rates at the bottom
end of bargaining council wage schedules are relatively low. Whether these rates are
nevertheless a barrier for small firms or whether it is the rates higher up the wage schedule
that are the barrier for small firms requires more detailed research. 
  
3. Research Findings: Enforcement and Compliance 
3.1   Bargaining Council Agents (Inspectors) and Inspections
Councils were asked to state how many agents each had in 2000, 2002 and 2004, and
whether they were employed full-time or part-time. As appears from Table 6, the number of
agents employed ranged from nil to 39.  The biggest numbers of agents employed were at the
large national councils, although it should be noted that two of these councils indicated that
they had no agents (primarily because they do not have extended agreements and therefore
do not have non-parties). The regional and small national councils tended to employ less than 
10 agents, and one employed no agents (because it does not extend its agreement). The
small local councils employed at most two agents, with two employing only part-time agents
and one having no agent. All the other councils employed only full-time agents.
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Table 6(a): Number of Agents, Inspections Per Year and Time Spent Tracing Unregistered Firms: National and/or Large Councils
Bargaining council Number of agents in 2000 Number of agents in 2004 Number of inspections per agentper year
Proportion of agents’ time
tracing unregistered firms
Chemical 0 0 0 0
Clothing 14 16 780 30
Electrical 4 10 700 20
Metal & Engineering 20 31 46 16
Road Freight 35 39 N/a Very little
SA Road Passenger 0 0 0 0
Textile N/a 1 N/a 30
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Table 6(b): Number of Agents, Inspections Per Year and Time Spent Tracing Unregistered Firms: Regional and Small National Councils
Bargaining council Number of
agents in 2000
Number of
agents in 2004
Number of inspections per
agent per year
Proportion of agents’ time
tracing unregistered firms
Building: Cape 21 13 120 36
Building: S&E Cape 9 4 900 50
Contract Cleaning 2 2 950 25
Entertainment 3 2 60 20
Furniture: KZN 3 3 169 15
Furniture: N Region 6 8 70 30
Furniture: W Cape 2 4 434 20
Grain Co-operative 0 0 3 0
Hairdressing: Semi-Nat. 3 3 70 35
Meat Trade: Gauteng 6 6 15 4
Tearoom: Pretoria 1 2 1 560 72
 56 
DPRU Working Paper 06/106                                          Shane Godfrey, Johann Maree and Jan Theron
Table 6(c): Number of Agents, Inspections Per Year and Time Spent Tracing Unregistered Firms: Small Regional and Local Councils
Bargaining council Number of agents in2000
Number of agents in
2004
Number of inspections per agent
per year
Proportion of agents’ time
tracing unregistered firms
Building: Bloemfontein 2 0 104 N/a
Building: Kimberley 1 2 1 000 2
Canvas: Wits & Pretoria 1 1 35 5
Diamond Cutting 1 1 N/a 10
Furniture: E Cape 0.5 0.5 427 80
Furniture: SWD N/a 1 15 60
Hairdressing: Cape 1 2 550 10
Hairdressing: Pretoria N/a 2 N/a 0
Jewellery 1 1 20 20
Laundry: Cape 1 1 50 N/a
Laundry: Natal 0.5 0.5 70 10
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Nine councils had increased the number of agents over the period, although in most
instances not by much. The exception was the large national council category, where three
of the five councils with agents had substantially increased the number of agents over the
period (the most significant increase was the Metal and Engineering bargaining council
which increased the number of agents by 55 per cent). Four councils had fewer agents in
employment in 2004 than in 2002. Fourteen had exactly the same number of agents. 
The number of agents a council is able to employ depends to an extent on the number of
employees within the jurisdiction of the council in respect of whom contributions are paid. At
the same time agents may be required not only to monitor conditions of employment at firms
that are registered with the council, but also to track down unregistered firms. 
To gauge the capacity of the agents to operate effectively in the sector concerned, and also
to put in perspective any changes in the number of agents, we compared the number of
agents employed with the total number of employees within the jurisdiction of each council
(an alternative way would be to compare the number of agents with the number of firms
within the jurisdiction of each council). As might be expected, given the diversity of councils,
the ratio of agents to employees within the jurisdiction of each council varied hugely. In the
larger national councils there were fewer agents in relation to employees. In the case of the
Textile bargaining council, there was only one agent for over 23 000 employees in the entire
country, although this is probably in part because it is a newly-established council. In the
case of the Metal and Engineering bargaining council there was one agent for 8 799
employees in 2004, compared with one for 10 706 employees in 2002, when the number of
inspectors was far fewer, and one for 9 813 in 2000, when the number of employees was
significantly less. The clothing industry had one agent for 6 122 employees, while the council 
that employs the most agents (road freight) had one agent for every 1 836 employees in
2004.
At regional councils the number of agents in relation to employees tended to be less than
one per two thousand. Five councils had one full-time agent for less than a thousand
employees, while both the councils utilising part-time agents covered less than a thousand
employees.
Councils were asked to estimate the average (looking at the past five years) number of
inspections done per year by each agent. The responses are recorded in the tables above,
and varied from nil to an incredible 1 560 inspections a year (in the case of the Tearoom,
Restaurant and Catering council). In general, it appeared that smaller, regional or local
councils conducted more inspections per agent. The council with the next highest number of
inspections per agent per year was also a relatively small local council (the Kimberley
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Building council). On the other hand, larger councils such as the Metal and Engineering
bargaining council distinguished between routine inspections and inspections in response to 
a complaint, and only answered in respect of the former category, presumably because
there is no national record of the latter.
The responses regarding the number of inspections conducted should be correlated with the 
responses to a further question, in which councils were asked to estimate the proportion of
an agent’s time that is spent on tracking down unregistered firms. As appears from the above 
tables, some councils spent no time at all on this task, mainly because their agreements
were not extended to non-parties. However, many councils whose agreements were
extended evidently did not regard this as a key element of the agent’s role, and some said
agents would only track down unregistered firms if there was a complaint. Eleven out of 27
councils stated that agents spent 10 per cent or less of their time tracking down unregistered
firms. There were 21 councils that said agents spent 30 per cent of their time or less doing
so. Most of the large national councils that extended their agreements were in the latter
category. On the other hand, the four councils that estimated that more than 50 per cent of an 
agent’s time was taken up with unregistered firms were all smaller, regional councils.
  
3.2   Compliance Orders
Councils were asked to specify how many compliance orders were issued in 2000, 2002 and 
2004. However, most councils that responded to this question did not have figures for 2000
and 2002, and only provided data for 2004. Some did not respond at all, and it was not clear
in all instances whether this was because no compliance orders were issued or because the
council was unable (or unwilling) to put a figure on it.31 The 2004 figures are reflected in
Table 7.
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31 One of the larger national councils (road freight) does not issue compliance orders as a matter of policy, but in
each instance in which there is an alleged breach of the collective agreement convenes a conciliation meeting.
Table 7(a): Enforcement of Agreements: National and/or Large Councils
Bargaining council No. of compliance orders in2004
% that result in
compliance
No. or arbitration
awards in 2004
Labour Court orders 
in 2004
Chemical 0 0 0 0
Clothing 1 276 40 1 276 763
Electrical 3 500 50 504 6
Metal & Engineering 2 458 73 336 62
Road Freight 512 N/a 658 1 208
SA Road Passenger 0 0 0 0
Textile 14 20 6 0
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  Table 7(b): Enforcement of Agreements: Regional Councils and Small National Councils
Bargaining council No. of compliance orders in2004
% that result in
compliance
No. or arbitration
awards in 2004
Labour Court orders 
in 2004
Building: Cape 194 47 17 26
Building: S&E Cape 0 60 0 0
Contract Cleaning 0 50 58 6
Entertainment 25 90 0 0
Furniture: KZN 157 46 68 31
Furniture: N Region 626 85 463 347
Furniture: W Cape 298 Unknown 92 3
Grain Co-operative 0 0 0 0
Hairdressing: Semi-Nat. 31 95 3 1
Meat Trade: Gauteng 20 60 9 2
Tearoom: Pretoria 180 10 170 31
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  Table 7(c): Enforcement of Agreements: Small Regional and Local Councils
Bargaining council No. of compliance
orders in 2004
% that result in
compliance
No. or arbitration
awards in 2004
Labour Court
orders in 2004
Building: Bloemfontein 141 78 9 5
Building: Kimberley 100 68 32 1
Canvas: Wits & Pretoria 0 0 0 0
Diamond Cutting 0 0 0 0
Furniture: E Cape 4 75 1 0
Furniture: SWD 9 20 6 0
Hairdressing: Cape 120 80 20 0
Hairdressing: Pretoria 1 083 100 101 82
Jewellery 10 Most 1 0
Laundry: Cape 0 0 0 0
Laundry: Natal 19 80 10 1
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The table shows that the number of compliance orders issued in 2004 range from nil to 3
500. The largest number of compliance orders were issued by three national councils, i.e.
Electrical Industry bargaining council, the Metal and Engineering bargaining council, and the 
Clothing Industry bargaining council, which is the largest of the councils in terms of
employees covered. The first two councils were able to provide data regarding the number of 
compliance orders issued in 2000 and 2002: 2 500 and 2 900 in the case of the Electrical
Industry council, and 1 148 and 1 657 in the case of the Metal and Engineering council. This
represents respectively an increase of 40 per cent and 114 per cent over the entire period,
during which the number of employees covered by the councils increased by some 62 per
cent and 39 per cent respectively. In this and similar instances further research would be
needed to establish what (if any) significance attaches to this increase.
The Road Freight bargaining council does not utilise compliance orders. Instead it convenes 
conciliation hearings for all contraventions of agreements and at the end issues a certificate
of outcome. Failure by an employer to comply with such a certificate would result in the
council proceeding with an arbitration. It is unclear why the number of arbitration awards that 
were executed as Labour Court orders in 2004 was so much higher than the number of
arbitration awards in that year. One explanation would be that the execution of arbitration
awards in 2004 included a large number of awards that were made in 2003. 
Councils were also asked to estimate what proportion of compliance orders resulted in
compliance on the part of the employers. Table 7 shows a wide range of responses, but with
most councils indicating that there was generally a quite high level of compliance. As a
result, it is not surprising that a relatively small proportion of compliance orders were referred 
to arbitration, and still fewer were made an order of the Labour Court. The third and fourth
columns reflect the actual numbers of such arbitration awards and Labour Court orders in
2004. However, in the case of one council (the Clothing Industry bargaining council) the
number of arbitration awards issued in 2004 was 1 276. This corresponds with the number of 
compliance orders that year. This is presumably indicative of the major problem of
non-compliance that has manifested in the clothing sector in the course of 2004 and 2005.
The relatively high number of cases resulting in Labour Court orders (763) is also suggestive 
of this. 
There is much in the table that requires further investigation. For example, there were
relatively high proportions of arbitrations that resulted in Labour Court orders at the Furniture 
(Northern Region) council and the Hairdressing (Pretoria) council (bearing in mind that
orders granted in 2004 may relate to awards handed down in 2003 or before, due to delays in 
the legal process). 
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Councils were asked to explain what the outcome was with respect to arbitration awards that 
were not executed as an order of the Labour Court, i.e. did they procure compliance, or were
they not executed for other reasons. On the whole councils did not respond to this question
satisfactorily. It nevertheless appears that in most instances employers did comply with
arbitration awards, albeit after some arm-twisting by the council. Some councils referred to
settlement agreements being reached with the employers concerned. These are
presumably agreements on terms less favourable than provided in the award. In some
instances firms were reported as having closed down, or as having transferred the business
to a new owner. In at least two instances councils had granted exemption to such firms
subsequent to and notwithstanding the award. 
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  4.   Research Findings: Exemptions from Bargaining Council Agreements
An employer may apply for exemption from the provisions of a collective agreement of a
bargaining council. It is important to bear in mind that the controversy about the question of
exemptions, as noted above, relates to applications by employers who are not parties to the
council. However, employer parties also apply for exemptions for a range of reasons. For the 
purposes of analysis it is necessary to distinguish these two categories, since party
applications will almost by definition relate to provisions that are not perceived as core to the
agreement in question, such as minimum wages. Party employers, as also noted, tend to be
larger firms, whereas non-party employers are more likely to be small or very small (although 
this is not the case for every council).
  4.1   Structures for Considering Exemptions
Councils were asked about the structures that determined applications for exemption, and
appeals against refusals to grant exemptions. In most cases (19 councils) the committee
that considered the initial applications for exemptions was a subcommittee of the council
itself. In most cases where councils did not have a sub-committee that heard exemptions it
was the full council that did so. However, it appears that at least some councils in fact treated
applications by parties and non-parties differently. In the case of one council, for example,
the sub-committee heard applications for exemptions by parties to the council while an
application by an employer that was not a party to the council was heard by an independent
committee. It was not clear what the relationship was between this independent committee
and the independent body the council had established to hear appeals. 
Seven of the councils (24 per cent) had not established an independent body to hear
appeals against the refusal of exemption. As already noted, the establishment of such a
body is one of the pre-conditions for the extension of a collective agreement in terms of
section 32(3). Councils that did have an independent exemptions committee were asked to
give some indication as to credentials or qualifications of the persons on this committee. In
most cases the committee was composed of lawyers, CCMA commissioner, ex-trade
unionists, academics with industrial relations credentials and in one instance, a person with
financial expertise. 
Two broad approaches were discernable to the structure of the appeals body, and by
implication to the determination of appeals. Some councils clearly endeavoured to structure
the committee on bi-partite or tri-partite lines. For example one council emphasised that all
persons on the committee should have experience of the industry in which it operated. There 
was a person with an employer background, a person with a union background and an
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ex-bargaining council agent. Another council had the council composed of ‘independent
individuals representing commerce/industry, academia and labour.’ However, it indicated
that the person representing labour on such a committee should not be a trade unionist,
presumably meaning a representative of a party trade union.   
The implication of structuring the appeals body in this way is that the issue is primarily of a
labour relations character. Yet other councils see the body as having a quasi-judicial, or
adjudicative role, in which appeals are heard by a single person rather than a committee.
One council, for example, had a panel of ombudspersons, one half of whom had been
nominated by trade union parties and one half nominated by employer parties. Cases were
then heard on a rotational basis, i.e. one case by an employer-nominated ombudsperson,
and the next case by a trade union nominated one. In another case the person was
appointed on an ad hoc basis from the panel of a dispute resolution body such as Tokiso.
Another referred appeals to the CCMA. Two councils relied on the exemption committee
(evidently a panel) of the National Association of Bargaining Councils.
In one instance it was a panel composed of an independent arbitrator, with the council’s chair 
and vice-chair as assessors. Given that the chair and vice-chair would have been party or
privy to the refusal of exemption, one has to question the independence of such a
committee. In the case of a council whose committee is composed of two members of the
council’s executive committee and a trade union official, it would seem the committee is
clearly not independent. 
4.2   Criteria for Exemptions
Councils were asked what criteria were used in considering applications for exemptions,
and whether these criteria were published or not. Only three councils said they had no
criteria. One council justified its lack of criteria on the grounds that “no-one asks for
exemption – except from the pension [fund]. The others just lie low and hope they are not
found.” With a few exceptions the councils that had criteria published them in the collective
agreement and/or in the council’s constitution. A few took additional steps to make these
criteria known, such as publication on the council’s website. In one of the larger, national
councils the criteria are set out in a national exemptions policy.
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An example of the exemptions criteria used by a council (the Textile bargaining council) is as
follows:
(a) Whether the granting of the exemption will prejudice the objectives of the 
bargaining council or contravene the provisions of any labour legislation or 
collective agreements;
(b) The circumstances prevailing in the textile industry as a whole or the 
sub-sectors likely to be affected by the application;
(c) The nature and size of the business in respect of which the application is 
made;
(d) Whether the duration of the exemption is for a limited or specified period; 
(e) Any representations made by the employees likely to be affected by the 
application;
(f) Whether the business plan presented by the applicant demonstrates that the 
granting of the exemption will make a material difference to the long-term 
viability of the business in respect of which the exemption is sought;
(g) Whether a refusal to grant an exemption will result in undue financial 
hardship to the applicant;
(h)  Whether the granting of the exemption will undermine collective bargaining 
and is likely to cause undue financial hardship to the employees affected;
(i) Whether the granting of the exemption will impact negatively on parity 
agreements; and
(j) Whether the granting of the exemption will impact negatively on local 
competitors who are complying with collective agreements.
The exemptions criteria for a much smaller council (the Pretoria Hairdressing council) are as 
follows:
(a)  The written and verbal substantiation provided by the applicant;
(b) The extent of consultation with and the petition for or against the granting of 
the exemption as provided by employers or employees who are to be 
affected by the exemption if granted;
(c) The terms of the exemption;
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(d) The infringement of basic conditions of employment rights;
(e) The fact that competitive advantage is not created by the exemption;
(f) The views on exemption from any employee benefit fund or training 
provision in relation to the alternative comparable bona fide benefit 
or provision, including the cost to the employee, transferability, 
administration management, and cost, growth and stability;
(g) The extent to which the proposed exemption undermines collective 
bargaining and labour peace in the Hairdressing and Cosmetology 
Trade;
(h) Any existing special economic or other circumstances that warrant 
the granting of the exemption;
(i) Reporting requirements to be met by the applicant, and the 
monitoring and re-evaluation provisions; and
(j) Cognisance of the recommendations contained in the Report of 
the Presidential Commission to investigate the Labour Market 
Policy.
There were four councils that said they had criteria but had not published them. However,
these were typically vague, such as ‘unfair competition’, or ‘whether the application will
disadvantage other members of the council.’ It is also questionable how much regard can be
had for criteria that are not published, since they are not known to the applicant. On the other
hand, the criteria that have been published comprise eight or more sub-categories which
appear to derive from the same precedent and which are, in most instances, not specific to
the industry in question. With the exception of criteria that cater for specific kinds of
application, such as applications for exemption from an employee benefit fund (where the
existence of an alternative comparable benefit is a relevant criterion) there is no indication
as to what weighting will be given to the different criteria. Arguably publication is not of great
assistance to the potential applicant. 
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4.3   The Procedure for Applying for Exemption 
The overwhelming majority of councils (21 out of 29) utilised a standard form for applications 
for exemption, although this does not necessarily mean that councils would not accept any
written application. Almost all the councils also said they allowed an applicant to appear in
person before a committee hearing such an application. One only did so on appeal and
another only allowed an appearance ‘if specifically requested.’ Almost all councils also said
they contacted the relevant unions and/or employees to get their views on the application,
and to object if they so wished. However, this is a question a council was unlikely to answer
in the negative, even where it was less than diligent in doing so.
The time taken to process applications for exemption also does not appear unreasonable.
Three councils said they took two weeks to do so, but this was clearly not practicable for the
majority, and in all cases it would depend on when an application was received. One council
said it took between one and four weeks, but the greatest number took four weeks (10
councils), or four to six weeks (3 councils), or four to eight weeks (3 councils). No council
said it took longer than eight weeks to process applications. 
If the respondents are to be believed, written reasons are always given for the refusal of an
application. Only one council said it did not give reasons, although it would if reasons were
requested. It was of course not possible within the scope of this survey to consider the
adequacy of the reasons given, which no doubt varies considerably from council to council.
  
4.4   Conditional Exemptions
Councils were asked whether exemptions (whether partial and full exemptions) were
sometimes granted subject to conditions other than a time limit, and if so what kind of
conditions were usually attached to exemptions. Eighteen councils said they did sometimes
grant exemptions subject to such conditions, while ten stated that they did not do so. 
The types of conditions included the provision for a phase in of the conditions for which the
exemption is sought, or some kind of ‘catch-up’ period (3 councils); that proof is provided of
the financial situation of the employer, or the benefits it provides (3 councils); that provision is 
made for alternative benefits (3 councils); that the employer complies with other 
Conditions of Employment and Small Business: Coverage, Compliance and Exemptions
 69 
requirements; or that the implementation of the exemption is monitored.32 Five responses to
this question were incomprehensible.
  
4.5   The Number of Exemptions Granted
Councils were asked to provide a series of data for the years 2000, 2002 and 2004 regarding 
exemptions. Table 8 reflects the data provided regarding the number of applications made
and granted, split into the three categories of councils. Note that the data is for 17 councils
only; these were the councils that provided data for all three years. It is unfortunate that more 
councils could not provide data for the full period as this would have given a much better
indicator of trends over the five years. A number of very large councils provided data only for
2004. Hence the total number of exemption applications in 2004 was 2 783.
  Table 8(a): Exemption Applications, Granted and Refused: All Councils
2000 2002 2004
Total applications made for exemption 494 708 649
Total exemptions granted in full 321 432 264
Total exemptions partially granted 22 63 203
Total exemptions granted subject to conditions 14 28 37
Total number of applications refused 135 185 145
 
Table 8(b): Exemption Applications: National and/or Large Councils
2000 2002 2004
Total applications made for exemption 291 487 319
Total exemptions granted in full 220 331 151
Total exemptions partially granted 8 23 38
Total exemptions granted subject to conditions 8 18 25
Total number of applications refused 55 115 105
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32 It is not clear that these are all conditions. The first instance appears to be a variation on a time limit whereas some
of the others appear to be requirements of the exemption application rather than conditions.
Table 8(c): Exemption Applications: Regional Councils and Small National Councils
2000 2002 2004
Total applications made for exemption 149 154 236
Total exemptions granted in full 60 49 38
Total exemptions partially granted 11 37 163
Total exemptions granted subject to conditions 6 9 10
Total number of applications refused 72 59 25
Table 8(d): Exemption Applications: Small Regional and Local Councils33
2000 2002 2004
Total applications made for exemption 54 67 94
Total exemptions granted in full 41 52 75
Total exemptions partially granted 3 3 2
Total exemptions granted subject to conditions 0 1 2
Total number of applications refused 8 11 15
Table 8 (a) shows that there was a quite dramatic increase in the number of applications for
exemptions between 2000 and 2002 (43 per cent), and then a bit of a fall-off in 2004
(although this figure is still 31 per cent up on the 2000 figure). The proportion of exemptions
granted in full in 2000 was 65 per cent, and if one includes partial and conditional exemptions 
this proportion rose to 72 per cent. In 2002 the equivalent proportions were 61 per cent
granted in full and 74 per cent when one includes the partial and conditional exemptions. In
2004 the proportions were 41 per cent and 78 per cent. The overall proportion of exemptions
granted therefore remained fairly constant in the 70 per cent range, but there was an
increasing number of partial exemptions as against full exemptions. This was primarily the
result of a very big increase in partial exemptions granted by the Furniture (Greater Northern
Region) bargaining council.34
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33 Note that the figures for 2000 do not add up to the total number of applications made. This is probably because
some applications were withdrawn.
34 The increase appears to have been generated by the introduction of a new benefit fund, which resulted in a big rise 
in exemption applications, and presumably an increase in exemptions that were granted subject to an alternative
fund offering equivalent or better benefits.
When one disaggregates the data into the three categories of council one finds quite
different trends emerging. The large national council category shows a sharp increase in
applications in 2002 (up by 67 per cent) and then a dip in 2004 (up by 10 per cent on the 2000 
figure). The Road Freight council, in particular, contributed to the increase in applications, in
part because of the increase in the number of employees covered by the council over the
period. The success rate of applications to the large national councils, however, showed a
steady decline over the period. In 2000 76 per cent of all applications were granted in full, but 
this dropped to 68 per cent in 2002 and to 47 per cent in 2004. When one adds in the partially
granted and conditional exemptions, the success rate also shows a decline: from a high 81
per cent in 2000, to 76 per cent in 2002, to 67 per cent in 2004.
There is a different pattern in the regional and small national council category. In this
category the number of applications increases slightly between 2000 and 2002 by 3 per
cent, and then rises sharply in 2004 (up 58 per cent on the 2000 figure). As with the national
council category, one council – Furniture (Northern Region) – accounted for a significant part 
of the increase. The success rate of applications granted in full was much lower than overall
rate: 40 per cent in 2000, 32 per cent in 2002, and 16 per cent in 2004. However, this
changes dramatically when one includes the partially granted exemptions and conditional
exemptions, mainly because of the influence of the data for the Furniture (Northern Region)
council: 52 per cent in 2000, 62 per cent in 2002, and 89 per cent in 2004. This is, as noted
above, mainly because of the increase number of applications and partially granted
exemptions that followed the introduction of a new benefit fund by the council.
The small regional and local council category shows an increase in the number of exemption 
applications, ending 74 per cent up on the 2000 total. In this case the success rate of
applications is high and almost constant, both for the exemptions granted in full (starting at
76 per cent and ending at 80 per cent) and when one includes the partially granted
exemptions and conditional exemptions (82 per cent in 2000 and 84 per cent in 2004). 
It should be emphasised that the above data is for 17 councils only, i.e. the councils that
submitted data for the entire period. Twenty-four councils submitted data for 2004.
Examining this data shows that of the 2 783 applications made, 2 037 were granted full
exemption, 208 were partially granted, 40 were granted subject to conditions, and 425 were
refused. This gives an even better success rate than for the councils that provided data for all 
three years: 73 per cent of applications were granted in full and 82 per cent were granted in
full or partially or subject to conditions.
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4.6   The Number of Appeals 
Councils were asked to provide the following data in respect of appeals against exemption
refusals by year for the years 2000, 2002 and 2004. Note that only 16 councils provided data
for all three years (not all the same as the above 17 councils). Table 9 focuses on the data
provided by the 16 councils. 
 Table 9: Appeals against the Refusal of Exemption Applications
2000 2002 2004
Total number of appeals against the refusal of an
exemption application 35 33 76
Total exemptions granted in full on appeal
4 8 9
Total exemptions granted partially or subject to 
conditions on appeal
9 10 55
Total number of appeals refused
22 15 12
The data suggests that only a small proportion of refused exemptions are taken on appeal.
The 17 councils analysed in Tables 8 (a) to (d) above overlap to a large extent with the 16
councils analysed in respect of appeals. When comparing the data for the two sets of
councils one finds that only about 16 per cent of refusals were taken on appeal in 2000, and
that this declined to about 8 per cent in 2002 and 2004.
The data indicates an overall increase in the number of appeals, although this increase is
primarily the result of appeals at one council jumping significantly (i.e. the Furniture
(Northern Region) bargaining council). The reasons for the increase at the latter council are
almost certainly linked to the introduction of the new benefit scheme discussed above. This
also accounts for the jump in the number of partially granted exemptions on appeal.
Refusals of exemptions on appeal make up a relatively large proportion of appeals in 2000
and 2002, respectively 63 per cent and 45 per cent. But in 2004 refusals on appeal declined
dramatically, primarily as a result of the Furniture (Northern Region) council granting a large
number of partial exemptions on appeal. The proportion of refused exemptions in 2004 was
16 per cent. However, if one looks at all the data received for 2004 (i.e. 22 councils provided
data for 2004) the refusal rate climbs to 33 per cent (of a total of 115 appeals).
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4.7   The Number of Employees Covered by Exemptions 
Councils were also asked to indicate how many employees were covered by the (full and
partial) exemptions granted each year in 2000, 2002 and 2004. Only 14 councils provided
data for the three years. The results are in Table 10, split into the three categories of
councils:
  Table 10: Number of Employees Covered by Exemptions
Category of bargaining council 2000 2002 2004
National and/or large councils (2 councils) 756 1 969 2 500
Regional & small national councils (5 councils) 228 328 1 459
Small regional & local councils (7 councils) 144 583 286
TOTAL (14 councils) 1 128 2 880 4 245
The data indicates a surprisingly low number of employees covered by exemptions,
although there is a steep increase in the number of employees over the period. The low
number of employees compared to the number of exemptions granted strongly suggests
that the majority of exemptions are for small firms.
As one would expect, most employees covered by exemptions fall under the large national
councils. This category shows an increase in employees over the period in line with the
overall data. The same trend emerges in the regional and small national council category.
The small regional and local council category shows a different trend, with a peak in 2002
Again, it is unfortunate that more councils could not provide data for all three years as this
would have given a clearer indication of trends. Twenty-one councils provided data for 2004,
which indicated that the total number of employees covered by exemptions in that year was
30 817, mainly because of the inclusion of 22 681 employees covered by exemptions from
the Clothing Industry bargaining council.35 
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35 The Clothing Industry bargaining council could not report on data for 2002 and before because it did not exist as a
national bargaining council at that point.
  
4.8   The Number of Exemptions Granted to Small Business  
   
It follows from what has been said above that it is important to know how many applications
for exemptions are from small business, and it is therefore necessary to know how a ‘small
business’ is defined by councils. Councils were asked whether they had a definition of small,
medium and large firms. Sixteen councils said they had and thirteen did not. 
Not surprisingly, given that they operate in different industries that each have their own
structures and distribution of firm sizes, the definitions of small, medium and large firms
varies enormously between councils. The overwhelming majority of councils (13 out of 16)
define small firms as employing less than 10 employees. However, one (Contract Cleaning)
defines small firms as employing less than 50 while one (SA Road Passenger) defines small
firm as having less than 100 employees. By way of contrast, the Road Freight council defines
a small firm as one employing up to 2 drivers.
At the other extreme there are two councils that view large firms as ones employing more
than 10 employees. These are Hairdressing (Cape Peninsula) and Building (Cape). But the
largest number of councils (5 out of 9) give definitions for large firms as employing more than
50 employees. That means councils most commonly view medium firms to range between 10 
and 50 employees.
Councils were asked to break down the applications made in 2000, 2002 and 2004 by size of
firms, i.e. small, medium and large. A total of 14 councils provided data for all three years.
This is displayed in Table 11, firstly in total and then split into the three different categories of
councils.
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Table 11: Exemption Applications by Types of Councils and Size of Firm
2000 2002 2004
All councils (14 councils):                                                                  Small firms
                                                                                                            Medium-sized firms
                                                                                                            Large firms
229
106
197
422
49
172
397
42
154
Small regional and local councils (7 councils):                                  Small firms
                                                                                                            Medium-sized firms
                                                                                                            Large firms      
45
11
2
47
20
4
80
16
0
Regional and small national councils (6 councils):                            Small firms
                                                                                                            Medium-sized firms
                                                                                                            Large firms
105
95
4
107
29
3
192
26
7
National and/or large councils (1 council):                                        Small firms
                                                                                                            Medium-sized firms
                                                                                                            Large firms
79
0
191
268
0
165
125
0
147
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The above data indicates that the largest proportion of applications for exemption for the 14
councils were from small firms, as defined by the council concerned (43 per cent in 2000; 66
per cent in 2002; and, 67 per cent in 2004). Furthermore, the applications from small firms
increased over the period, although the 2004 figure is somewhat down on the 2002 figure.
Applications from medium-sized and large firms, on the other hand, declined over the five
years. 
Unfortunately, only one of the large national councils provided data for the entire period (i.e.
the Road Freight council). The council accounts for almost all the applications from large
firms (191, 165 and 147 in the three years), most probably because of the way the council
defines small, medium and large firms. The council also accounts for a large proportion of
the applications from small firms, with the trend following the overall pattern of a sharp rise in
2002 and then a dip to 2004.
Few large firms make application to councils in the regional and small national council
category and the small regional and local council category. Applications to councils in the
former category are mainly from medium-sized and small firms, and applications to the latter
category are mainly from small firms. This reflects the size of firms that tend to be covered by 
the councils in these categories. In both categories exemption applications from small firms
increase marginally between 2000 and 2002, and then increase significantly in 2004.
Twenty councils submitted data for 2004. Analysis of this data shows that 1 564 applications
were made to the councils in that year, of which 42 per cent came from small firms. Almost
the same number of applications came from medium-sized firms, mainly because of a very
large number of applications to the Metal and Engineering bargaining council. This suggests 
that if more councils had provided data for all three years the findings could have been quite
different.
Councils were then asked how many applications from small firms were refused. The
responses of the 13 councils that provided data for both applications from small firms for all
three years and number of applications from small firms refused for the three years are
recorded in Table 12, split into total applications, all applications from small firms refused,
and refusals of small firms applications by category of council. 
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  Table 12: The Number of Refused Exemption Applications from Small Firms
2000 2002 2004
Total applications from small firms (13 councils)
211 397 367
Applications from small firms refused by national and/or large councils
(1 council) 21 63 13
Applications from small firms refused by regional and small national
councils (6 councils) 21 20 21
Applications from small firms refused by regional and small national
councils (6 councils) 6 3 4
Applications from small firms refused by all councils (13 councils) 48 86 38
In Table 8 (a), which dealt with all exemption applications, the refusal rate was 27 per cent in
2000, 26 per cent in 2002, and 22 per cent in 2004. Table 12 shows that the refusal rate for
applications from small firms was lower across the period and was also declining: 23 per
cent of applications from small firms were refused in 2000; 22 per cent were refused in 2002;
and, 10 per cent were refused in 2004. Further research would be needed to establish why
the rate for small firms is lower than that for all firms. 
The refusal rate for applications from small firms at the national and/or other large council
category was 27 per cent, 24 per cent and 10 per cent across the three years. The rate
therefore starts higher than the rate for all small firms but ends on the same proportion in
2004. 
The refusal rate for exemption applications from small firms at the other two categories of
council was lower than the overall rate and that for national councils. The rate in the regional
and small national councils category was 20 per cent, 19 per cent and 11 per cent across the
three years, while the rate in the small regional and local councils category was 22 per cent,
9 per cent and 8 per cent over the period.
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Data supplied by the DoL in respect of 44 bargaining councils shows that in 2003 there were
7 373 applications for exemption, of which 4 344 were from small firms, i.e. 59 per cent
(which is fairly close to the rate established by our survey for 2002 and 2004).36 The total
number of applications granted was 5 670, i.e. 77 per cent. Of the 4 344 applications from
small firms, 3 407 were granted, i.e. 78 per cent. The success rate of small firm applications
was therefore fractionally higher than the rate for all applications. 
The overall success rate according to the DoL data was therefore almost the same as the
2004 rate established by our survey, assuming that the DoL is including partial and
conditional exemptions in its figures for granted applications. The slightly higher success
rate for applications from small firms is also replicated in the survey data, although in 2004
the survey data indicates a sharp increase in the success rate. 
In 2004 DoL reported on data from 37 councils. A total of 5 719 exemption applications were
made to the councils in the year, of which 1 380 were from small firms, i.e. 24 per cent. It is
unclear why there was such a large drop in applications from small firms. Of the 5 719
applications for exemption, 4 648 were granted (81 per cent), a success rate that is almost
the same as the rate the survey found when analysing all the data for 2004 (i.e. 82 per cent).
Of the 1 380 applications from small firms, 1 050 were granted (76 per cent). Although there
was a sharp reduction in the number of applications from small firms in 2004, the success
rate remained much the same as in 2003. It should be noted, furthermore, that at the end of
2004, 171 of the above exemption applications (3 per cent) were still under consideration, of
which 38 were from small firms (3 per cent). So the success rate would almost certainly be
higher once these applications have been finalised (and possibly would have ended much
closer to the higher success rate for 2004 found in the survey).
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36 The data supplied by the DoL uses the term ‘SMMEs’ but in fact refers only to small firms as defined by each
council.
4.9   The Number of Non-Party Applications
Councils were asked to break down the applications made in 2000, 2002 and 2004 by party
and non-party applications, by first-time applications and ‘repeat’ applications,37 by size of
firm, and by the type of application. Table 13 displays the results. Note that only councils that
provided data for all three years in each category are included. This was the case for 11
councils with respect to party/non-party applications, 12 councils for first-time and repeat
applications, and 12 for the type of request.
Table 13: Exemption Applications by Type of Application
2000 2002 2004
Number of party as opposed to                           
non-party applications: 
Party 38 39 39
Non-party 131 155 269
Number of first-time applications as
opposed to ‘repeat’ applications:                  
First-time 157 163 270
 ‘Repeats’ 13 30 39
Number of applicationsby type of request,
i.e.  exemption from: 
Entire main
agreement 10 11
8
Wage clause only 44 52
40
Benefit funds
56 101
263
Other 63 56 11
The most significant of the above figures is the comparison between party and non-party
applications, since the controversy about exemptions has essentially been about non-party
applications. What the above data tells us is that in all three years the vast majority of
applications at the 11 bargaining councils was from non-parties (it ranged from 78 per cent to 
87 per cent across the period). If one just looks at data for 2004 (20 councils provided data
for 2004), there were 948 applications from non-parties (65 per cent) as opposed to 507
applications from parties (35 per cent). The higher proportion of applications from parties is
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37 A ‘repeat’ application is where an exemption was granted subject to a time limit, so it is re-applied for again (and
again) at the end of each period.
largely accounted by high numbers for the Furniture (Western Cape) council, the Meat Trade 
(Gauteng) council, and the Metal and Engineering council.
Unfortunately, none of the 11 councils that provided data on applications from parties and
non-parties was in the national and/or other large council category. Examining the data
broken down by the remaining two categories, one finds that the number of applications from 
non-parties increases across the three years for councils in both the regional and small
national category and the small regional and local category (although the increase in the
former category is significantly steeper). However, the data on party applications reveals
different trends. In this case the applications from small regional and local councils steadily
increases across the period, whereas there is a steady decline in applications from parties at 
councils in the regional and small national category. It is unclear why this is so or whether it is 
significant. 
Table 13 also makes it evident that ‘repeat’ applications do not constitute a large proportion
of all exemption applications. Generally exemption applications are applied for on a
first-time basis.
It is perhaps not surprising that there were relatively few applications for exemption from the
entire agreement, because most firms not wanting to comply with the agreements at all are
unlikely to apply for an exemption. Instead, they would probably not register with the council.
It is nevertheless interesting that there is a quite high number of applications in respect of the 
wage clause. It would probably be safe to assume these are all applications by non-parties.
The largest proportion of applications, however, came in respect of council benefit funds.
Further research would be required to establish for which type of funds exemptions were
sought and whether this was because the firm had an alternative in place or was simply
unable to meet the cost of benefit fund contributions.
Twenty-one councils submitted data only for 2004. This shows a quite significant difference
to the data submitted by the 12 councils across the entire period, mainly because of the
impact of the Metal and Engineering bargaining council data. There were still few
applications for exemption from the entire agreement (14), but a much higher proportion of
applications were from the wage clause (513 applications). Applications for exemption from
the benefit funds were high (491), but there was a big jump in the number of ‘other’
exemptions (448).  
Conditions of Employment and Small Business: Coverage, Compliance and Exemptions
 81 
Councils were asked to estimate what proportion of refused applications was from
non-parties in the period 2000-2004. The average proportion across the 17 councils that
provided an estimate was 33 per cent, but it should be noted that there was a wide range of
responses. Seven of the 17 councils stated that none of the applications from non-parties
had been refused, while one council indicated that all refused applications had come from
non-parties. Three councils estimated that over 85 per cent of refused applications were
from non-parties. The average of 33 per cent is somewhat higher than the refusal rate for all
applications (see above) and is significantly higher than the refusal rate for small firms.  
Five of the large national councils provided estimates. In two cases the councils indicated
that none of the refused applications was from non-parties (in one case because the
agreement is not extended). However, the remaining three councils (Chemical, Textile, and
Metal and Engineering) all estimate that 50 per cent or more of refused applications was
from non-parties.
 
4.10   Previously Unregistered Firms that Apply for Exemption
We also sought to establish to what extent exemption applications were generated by
councils’ inspectors locating previously unregistered firms that when compelled to register
did so simultaneously with an application for exemption. Councils were therefore asked to
estimate the proportion of exemptions from previously unregistered firms that had been
‘caught’ and had registered but simultaneously applied for exemption. 
Nineteen councils provided an estimate. The average of the estimate across the 19 councils
was 20 per cent, but it must be noted that there was a wide range of responses. Thirteen
councils indicated that less than 5 per cent of applications were from such ‘caught’ firms. But
a few councils estimated that 80 per cent to 90 per cent of applications were generated in
this way. None of the large national councils were in the latter category.
  
4.11   Blanket Exemptions
Councils were asked whether any category of business was granted an automatic (or
blanket) exemption. A blanket exemption is where a business is exempted from a collective
agreement simply by virtue of belonging to the relevant category without the necessity of
formally applying for exemption, although this does not necessarily mean a business is not
required to register with the council. 
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Ten councils (out of 27) stated that they did provide for blanket exemptions. Of these, six
granted blanket exemptions to small enterprises employing less than five people or
one-person or owner-driver (in the case of Road Freight) or owner-builder operations (in the
case of Building). Four councils did not base their categorisation on the size of the business
but rather the type of business. The categories exempted were Afro hairdressing (in respect
of salaries), low-cost home builders in ‘Black’ areas, laundromats, and gate & fence
manufacturers (in the case of Metal and Engineering).Three of the 10 councils that provided
for blanket exemptions were in the national and/or other large council category.
Only two councils did not require such businesses to register first with the council to qualify
for the exemption.38 Thus in the majority of cases the business had to first register with the
council to qualify for the exemption.
Where there was an automatic (or blanket) exemption, councils were asked to provide the
following data for the years 2000, 2002 and 2004, or to estimate the number of employers
and employees covered by the blanket exemption. Only four of the ten councils provided
data for all three years. The data is presented in Table 14.
  Table 14: Number of Firms and Employees Covered by Blanket Exemptions 
2000 2002 2004
Total number of firms covered by automatic (or blanket)
exemption 265 206 175
Total number of employees at the firms covered by
automatic exemptions 553 549 573
Even though the above data is for four councils only, it is apparent that blanket exemptions
do not cover a very large number of employees but do cover quite a large number of firms or
operations (obviously because of the size categories used for most blanket exemptions). As
confirmation of this, total coverage of blanket exemptions for seven councils in 2004 was
527 firms and 2 607 employees.
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38 These were the Cape Building bargaining council which has a blanket exemption for owner-builders and the
Pretoria Hairdressing council which has a blanket exemption for the Afro hairdressing sector (in respect of
salaries). 
 4.12   Other Provisions ‘friendly’ to Small Business
Councils were asked whether there were any other provisions besides a blanket exemption
in the council’s agreements that could be seen as in some way accommodating small
businesses (or other categories of business). Eight (out of 28) councils said there were,
while some indicated that this was not necessary as almost all firms in the industry were
small. The small business ‘friendly’ provisions can be categorised as follows: three councils
indicated wage concessions on a regional or sub-sectoral basis (i.e. the Afro hairdressing
sector); two councils made certain concessions in respect of the overtime rate and limit; two
councils stated that certain provisions were relaxed for workers starting in the industry (for a
stipulated period); and two councils had some form of phasing in of firms (one for firms in
former TBVC states that has now expired, one for the plastics sub-sector; one for 
enterprises operating in depressed areas such as Botshabelo; and one for Afro
hairdressing). It should be noted that some councils had more than one such provision for
small firms. It should also be noted that some of the provisions did not appear to be specific
to small firms.
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Part C: The BCEA and Sectoral Determinations
  
1. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA)
The BCEA applies to all employees in South Africa, excluding only employees of the SA
Defence Force and the two secret service agencies. The Act provides a floor of minimum
employment conditions with which all employment contracts must comply. The conditions
regulated by the Act range from maximum hours of work, limits on overtime, the rate of
overtime pay, annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave, family responsibility leave, notice
periods, and records to be kept by employers. The Act also sets up the Employment
Conditions Commission (ECC) which has certain advisory and reporting functions.
Importantly, the Act provides for a number of methods through which conditions can be
varied. These range from a limited set of conditions that can be varied by individual
agreement, a more extensive set of conditions that can be varied by collective agreement,
and another set that can be varied by a bargaining council agreement, a set of conditions
that can be varied by the Minister of Labour through a ministerial determination, and a set of
conditions that can be varied by a sectoral determination. The Act does not set a minimum
wage but minimum wages are introduced to sectors through sectoral determinations.
Negotiations in NEDLAC over the Act were adversarial and difficult. The Bill was eventually
referred to Parliament by the Minister of Labour on the basis that ‘sufficient consensus’ had
been reached. But part of the agreement in this regard was that the Act would not be
promulgated until an impact assessment study had been done on its likely impact on small
business. This study was done and concluded that overall the Act would not have a major
impact on small business but some conditions would impact negatively on firms in some
sectors. As a result of the study a ministerial determination was produced that relaxed four of 
the conditions in the Act for businesses employing less than 10 employees.
The BCEA is supposedly the most complete statement of the government’s concept of
‘regulated flexibility’. While, compared to the 1983 Act, it extended coverage, added new
conditions and improved certain conditions, it also provided that conditions could be varied
in certain ways. The Minister is able to vary conditions through sectoral determinations and
ministerial determinations, bargaining councils are able to vary conditions, unions and
employers can negotiate the variation of some conditions, and certain conditions can be
varied by individual agreements. However, all variation must be in terms of the Act, which in
each case specifies the conditions that can be varied in the above ways. The result is that
there is a set of ‘core’ conditions that cannot be varied at all. 
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1.1   Sectoral Determinations
In order to make a sectoral determination establishing basic conditions in a sector and area
the DoL first conducts an investigation of the conditions of employment in the sector
concerned (ss 52 and 53 of the BCEA deal with the procedure to be followed in conducting
the investigation). Following the investigation a report is prepared, which is submitted to the
Employment Conditions Commission (ECC). The ECC examines the report and advises the
Minister regarding the appropriateness of a sectoral determination taking into the account a
number of factors, including “the operation of small, medium and micro-enterprises, and
new enterprises” (s 54). The ECC advises the Minister by way of its own report in which it
makes recommendations regarding matters which should be included in the sectoral
determination. The Minister can refer certain matters with which he/she disagrees back to
the ECC for reconsideration.
A sectoral determination can deal with a wide range of minimum terms and conditions of
employment, but probably the most important is that it can introduce minimum wages for the
relevant sector and area. The range of conditions that a sectoral determination can cover
give wide scope for the variation of conditions in the Act for the circumstances of a particular
sector and area. But, as noted above, the Act specifies a number of conditions that a sectoral 
determination is not allowed to vary. Once the sectoral determination has legal effect its
provisions prevail over an equivalent provision in the BCEA.
1.2   Ministerial Determinations
The Minister is also able to vary conditions of employment by what are called ministerial
determinations. There are two types of ministerial determination. The first applies to “any
category of employees or category of employers” (s 50). Such a determination is made on
the advice of the ECC and is published in the Government Gazette. These ministerial
determinations are similar in many respects to sectoral determinations. They cover a
particular sector and area, deal with and vary a wide range of employment conditions, and
are restricted from varying certain conditions. The main difference in practice is that the
ministerial determinations have not introduced minimum wages.
The second type of ministerial determination is made as a result of an application by an
employer and/or registered employers’ organisation. In effect it is an application for an
exemption from one or other of the Act’s provisions (excluding specified conditions). The
Minister can ask the ECC to advise on such an application and may also request it to prepare 
guidelines for the consideration of such applications. A condition for the issue of such a
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determination is that the application must have the consent of every registered trade union
that represents employees in respect of whom the determination is to apply. However, a
determination may still be made if consent has not been obtained, if the application has been 
served on any registered trade union representing employees to which it would apply or, if 
there is no registered trade union, efforts have been made to bring the application to the
attention of the employees. 
Such a determination can be issued subject to conditions and for a period determined by the
Minister. The Minister can also on application by any affected party amend or withdraw the
determination.
1.3   Enforcement
The inspectorate of the DoL is responsible for the policing and enforcement of the BCEA and 
all determinations issued in terms of the Act (ss 64 to 66 deal with the functions and powers
of inspectors). As with the LRA, the BCEA decriminalised non-compliance and introduced a
new enforcement procedure. The new procedure starts with the inspector attempting to
secure a written undertaking from a non-complying employer in which the employer
undertakes to comply with the Act. The undertaking can also deal with the payments owing
to employees as a result of the non-compliance. The next step in the procedure is the issue
of a compliance order, which the inspector serves on the relevant employer(s). The
compliance order must set out the provisions that have not been complied with, any amounts 
the employer is required to pay, the steps the employer must take to rectify the
non-compliance, and the fine that may be imposed if the employer fails to comply.
Thereafter the employer can object to the compliance order to the Director-General (DG).
The DG can confirm, modify or cancel a compliance order or any part of an order. The
employer can then appeal to the Labour Court from the decision of the DG. The order is
suspended pending the final determination of the appeal by the Labour Court. The DG may
also apply to the Labour Court for a compliance order to be made an order of the Labour
Court. 
There are no requirements in the Act for employers, employers’ organisations or trade
unions to submit data to the DoL. The one area in which the DoL does gather data is with
regard to the investigations conducted pursuant to a sectoral determination. It is assumed
that the ECC also gathers data in order to perform its various advisory functions. Of course,
one would also expect the Department to be recording data on its own enforcements efforts,
i.e. number of inspectors, number of inspections, number of compliance orders, and related
matters. There does not, however, appear to be any attempt within the DoL to gather data on
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an on-going basis regarding the coverage of the various sectoral and ministerial
determinations. 
The same comments made above regarding the bargaining council data apply in the case of
data on the BCEA. What data is collected is not made easily available to the public.
  
2. Research Findings: The BCEA and Sectoral Determinations 
2.1   Coverage of the BCEA and Sectoral Determinations
The BCEA covers approximately 7.15 million employees.39 It must be noted, however, that
major sections of the Act do not apply to people employed at the same employer for less than 
24 hours per month, senior managerial employees and employees earning over R115 572
(the latter threshold is determined by the Minister and changes from time to time).
As noted above, sectoral and ministerial determinations are published by the Minister in
terms of the Act. Both provide for variations on the Act’s provisions but sectoral
determinations are also used to introduce minimum wages for sectors. Approximately 3.5
million workers are covered by sectoral determinations. To date the following sectoral
determinations have been published, together with the coverage of employers and
employees for each (note that the dates of the data vary according to when the investigation
for the sectoral determination was conducted).40
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39 This is the total number of employees as per the September 2004 LFS, minus employment in the SANDF and
minus the 2 358 012 employees covered by bargaining councils.
40 Note that the Sectoral Determination for the Clothing and Knitting Sector was effectively replaced by the National
Bargaining Council for the Clothing Industry’s collective agreement for non-metropolitan areas. It was
subsequently withdrawn.
Table 15: Coverage of Sectoral Determinations: Employers and Employees
    Sectoral determination Number of employers Number of employees
Agriculture 65 000 850 000
Domestic 850 000 1 000 000
Private Security 15 000 175 000
Contract Cleaning 10 000 65 000
Civil Engineering 1 500 147 913
Learnerships n/a 86 205
Wholesale and retail 65 000 979 608
Taxi n/a 130 000
Children in performance activities n/a 12 000
TOTAL 1 006 500 3 445 726
It is not known how many employees are covered by ministerial determinations.41 The
ministerial determinations are as follows:
• Small business
• Special Public Works Programmes
• Welfare sector
The 2002 amendment to the BCEA converted 16 of the ‘old’ wage determinations, still in
force in terms of the BCEA’s transitional arrangements, to sectoral determinations. It is not
known how many employers and employees these determinations cover.42 It is so long
since any of these determinations was updated that it is almost certain that in every case the
wage levels in the determinations are way below the current market rates. However, where
the determinations do have an impact is that they provide variations on the BCEA. For
example,  many of these determinations define a ‘casual’ employee as someone who works 
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41 The DoL could not provide this data.
42 The DoL could not provide this data.
for three days or less per week. Such workers are usually excluded from the coverage of
certain provisions in the determination. The ‘old’ sectoral determinations are as follows:
• Metal containers
• Cement products
• Glass and glassware
• Road passenger
• Hotel trade
• Catering trade
• Meat and cold storage
• Unskilled labour
• Sweets
• Funeral undertaking
• Goods transportation
• Laundry and dry cleaning
• Stone crushing
• Business equipment
• Letting of flats and rooms
• Accommodation establishments
It is evident from the list that some of the determinations are probably wholly or in large part
redundant because they have been superseded by bargaining councils.
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2.2   Enforcement of, and Compliance with the BCEA and Sectoral 
Determinations
The Department of Labour employs 706 inspectors to monitor and if need be enforce
compliance with the provisions of the BCEA, as well as other labour legislation: 42 are in
Mpumalanga, 69 in Limpopo, 159 in Gauteng (49 in Gauteng North and 110 in Gauteng
South), 58 in the Free State, 133 in KwaZulu-Natal, 33 in the Northern Cape, 53 in the North
West, 95 in the Western Cape, and 64 in the Eastern Cape.
According to the Department, the 706 inspectors did a total of 184 070 inspections in the
period April to December 2004. Extrapolating from this data would give a total of 245 000
inspections per year, with each inspector doing on average about 347 inspections per
year.43 The Department maintains data regarding the sectors in which inspections were
conducted. The largest number is in an ‘other’ category headed ‘households, extraterritorial
organisations and other’, presumably referring mainly to the domestic sector. The next
highest number is in the category ‘community, social and personal services’. Manufacturing
has the next highest total followed by the wholesale and retail trade. 
A total of 2 008 compliance orders were issued by the inspectors during 2003 and 2 241 in
2004. The Department was not able to provide data regarding the number of objections to
the above orders that were lodged by employers, but in 2004 the Director-General brought
447 applications to have compliance orders made an order of the Labour Court. The
Department maintains that during 2004 it achieved a compliance level of 79 per cent of
cases within 60 days of their being reported.
2.3   Exemptions (or Variations on Application) from the BCEA
In terms of section 50(1) of the BCEA, any employer may apply for a determination by the
Minister to replace or exclude any basic condition of employment provided for in the BCEA,
in respect of any category of employee. The Employment Conditions Commission has
determined guidelines in terms of which such applications will be considered by the
Department. These guidelines have not been published. The Department nevertheless
argues that they are in the ‘public domain’, and that the Department publicises the fact that
employers may apply for such a determination on its web-site and from time to time in the
media. 
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43 Note that the inspections do not deal only with the BCEA. Inspections also cover inter alia the OHSA and EEA.
Applications may be on a BCEA 6 form or in writing, providing the information stipulated in
the BCEA 6 form. This in essence requires full particulars of the variation sought, including
the number of employees affected thereby, and a motivation as to why the application should 
be granted. Importantly, an employer making such an application is required to annex the
consent of all registered unions that represent the employees in respect of whom the
determination is to apply. Alternatively, the employer must provide proof that such unions
have been notified of the application, and reasonable steps have been taken to bring the
application to the notice of employees. Where no agreement can be reached regarding an
application, the employer is required to specify the ‘points of dissension.’
Both the employer’s motivation and the concerns expressed by unions and/or employees
are considered in deciding whether to approve an application, as well as any impact there
might be on the health and safety of employees, or the family and responsibilities of
employees, as a consequence. What the Department refers to as the ‘quid pro quo’ is also
an important consideration. This seems to refer to any concession in respect of other
conditions of employment that the employer might be prepared to make, in an endeavour to
make the proposed determination more palatable to the employees.
According to the Department, applications are generally finalised within thirty days, during
which period of time the applicant may be called upon to provide further information, or an ‘in
loco’ investigation may take place. However, this was not borne out by the figure the
Department provided. During 2002/2003 there were 721 such applications received, of
which only 181 (25 per cent) were granted, 524 (72 per cent) were not finalized, and 3
refused. In the 2003/2004 period 1 801 applications were received, of which 297 (16 per
cent) were granted, 1 464 (81 per cent) were not finalized, and 8 were refused.44 According
to the Department the large number of pending applications in both years related to
exemptions from the Agriculture Sectoral Determination. Because so many applications
were received and were relatively complex, the Department appointed an economist to
investigate all of them. This led to the long delay in finalising the applications.
A far higher proportion of applications was finalised in the most recent 2004/2005 period. Of
848 applications, 394 were granted (46 per cent) and 228 (26 per cent) were refused.
However there were still 31 applications that had not been finalised, as well as a further 193
applications not accounted for. If one excludes the applications not finalised and those not
accounted for, the success rate for 2004/2005 was 63 per cent.
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44 If one excludes the applications not finalised, the success rate for exemption applications was 98 per cent in
2002/2003 and 97 per cent in 2003/2004.
The Department says reasons are given in writing when applications are refused. These
reasons generally refer to a failure to comply with the requirements of form BCEA 6, or to the
guidelines for determinations referred to above. In terms of these guidelines, certain kinds of 
determinations can only be granted for a specified period, and others are on an indefinite
basis. However as a rule first applications are granted only for twelve months, after which
applicants have to reapply.
The successful applications during the 2004/2005 period were in respect of 33 sections of
the BCEA, of which by far the highest proportion were applications for exemption from the
overtime provisions of the BCEA (34 per cent). The next largest category of applications
granted was in respect of the weekly and daily rest periods (14 per cent), followed by annual
leave (8 per cent) and family responsibility leave (7 per cent). 
The Department also provided data regarding applications for exemption from three sectoral 
determinations. In the case of the determination for the Agriculture Sector (Sectoral
Determination 8) there were 1 151 applications received of which 767 (67 per cent) were
granted. The vast majority of the applications were in respect of wages, but a significant
number of applications were also in respect of restrictions on deductions from wages (15 per 
cent). There were two applications granted in respect of the wages prescribed in the retail
sector determination (Sectoral Determination 9) and also two in respect of the private
security sector (Sectoral Determination 6). 
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  Part D: Conclusions
  
1.   Bargaining Councils
Bargaining councils are diverse institutions and one should be cautious about making
generalisations about them. While all councils use the same legislative framework, from
which they derive certain common features, the enabling nature of the framework gives
latitude to the parties to develop councils in different ways. We have sought to aggregate
data to provide an overview of the entire system as well as capture some of the diversity in
the system by splitting councils into three different categories (i.e. large national and other
large councils, regional and small national councils, and small regional and local councils). 
Bargaining councils cover just less than a third of employees that are potentially covered by
collective bargaining and less than 5 per cent of all such employees are covered by
extended agreements. The latter is a tiny proportion of the labour market and it is difficult to
understand why this issue has attracted so much controversy. Even in the sectors in which
the number of employees covered by extended agreements is relatively high, i.e.
Manufacturing and Transport, the proportion of employees is below 16 per cent. 
The above does not mean that councils do not create problems for small and new
businesses. A shortcoming of the Act in this regard is that the two quantitative requirements
for the extension of agreements don’t put pressure on employer parties to organise small
firms. An employers’ organisation with a minority of large employers can meet the first
requirement (i.e. employees of party employers as a proportion of all employees). A third
measure – party employers as a proportion of all employers – would put pressure on
employers’ organisations to put effort into recruiting and retaining small firms as members. It
is not surprising that in the absence of the third measure that party employers make up only
41 per cent of all registered employers, while the system as a whole is comfortably
representative on the first and second measures. National councils and other large councils
are even less representative on the third measure than the system as a whole.
However, the measurement of representivity is a problematic exercise. DoL officials state
that they measure representivity with respect to all employees within the jurisdiction of the
council and not just employees at registered firms. But accurate data is not available on the
total number of employers and employees that fall within the sectors and regions covered by
councils. This raises a question about using representivity as the basis for extending
agreements. The research shows that levels of non-registration constitute a major problem
for some councils (although the data needs to be treated with caution). 
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Importantly, the research shows that the bargaining council system mainly covers small
firms. Even the average size of party firms is not very big. However, the average size of party
firms at most of the large national councils is significantly bigger than the average size of
non-party firms as well as being much bigger than the average size of party firms at the
smaller councils. This suggests that the tensions around bargaining councils and small firms 
concern mainly the big councils.  
Data from the DoL shows that at 11 of 27 councils more than 40 per cent of small firms were
members of the party employers’ organisations. This is a surprising finding. However, almost 
all of the 11 councils are relatively small local or regional councils. The finding suggests that
the issue might therefore not be so much the numerical representivity of small firms on
councils but how effective representation is. Some of the interviews with bargaining council
officials confirmed this point, although the interviews also pointed to a way in which tensions
had been defused, namely through blanket exemptions.
The research also found that generally bargaining councils did not have a great deal of
enforcement capacity. Furthermore, the ratio of agents to employees at the large national
councils tends to be much larger than the ratio at the regional and local councils. The smaller 
local and regional councils also conducted more inspections per agent than the larger
national councils and tended to spend considerably more time tracking down unregistered
firms. On the other hand, the large national councils issued far more compliance orders,
which increased sharply over the period. The findings suggest that non-compliance and
non-registration is greater at large councils than at smaller councils. 
The number of exemption applications received by councils showed a significant rise
between 2000 and 2004, with the success rate (exemptions granted in full, partially granted
and subject to conditions) above 70 per cent over the period. The largest proportion of
exemption applications came from small firms: in 2002 and 2004 about two-thirds of all
applications were from small firms. And the refusal rate for exemption applications from
small firms was lower than for all firms and was declining. When splitting the applications into 
party and non-party applicants one finds that the vast majority of applications came from
non-party firms. However, the refusal rate for applications from non-parties is somewhat
higher than the refusal rate from all firms.   
The research therefore indicates that the exemption system at bargaining councils is no
longer the issue it once was. Representivity of councils, however, remains a critical issue,
particularly in the light of low representation of employers and problems in measuring
representivity. But even if numerical representivity was to improve, the challenge of getting
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effective representation for small firms appears to be intractable. Enforcement is clearly not
a solution to this problem.
1.1   Bargaining Councils: A System in Crisis?
Although the number of employees covered by councils has increased over the last decade
(even if one counts only the coverage of the private sector councils), the number of
bargaining councils has declined dramatically. In 1983 there were 104 councils, in 1992
there were 87 councils, in 1995 there were 80 councils, and in 2004 there were 57 councils,
of which nine were defunct and/or in the process of being wound up. The decline has not
been off-set by the establishment of the five councils in the public sector after the new LRA or 
by the few other councils that have been established (e.g. Chemical, Fishing, and Wood and
Paper). Significantly, the new councils that have been established have in most cases been
established with considerable difficulty after a long period of struggle. 
Part of the decline in the number of councils is accounted for by the merger of regional and
sub-sectoral councils to form bigger national councils (e.g. the Clothing and the Textile
councils), but part of the decline is the result of the councils ceasing to function and being
de-registered. It could be argued that this is a healthy process, which will end with a smaller
number of large national councils covering employees previously covered by regional and
local councils. The argument does not seem to be borne out by the evidence. New councils
are not established easily and the merger of councils is also a very slow and difficult process
(e.g. the merger of regional councils to form a national Clothing council took about eight
years and the council is still to all intents and purposes an amalgamation of regional
structures rather than a national structure). Where such councils are formed it seems that
they generally struggle to maintain a reasonable level of representivity. The problems
currently being faced by the Clothing bargaining council are a case in point.
While the slow process of mergers and establishment of new councils is going on, an
opposite and more rapid process of decline of regional and local councils is apparent. A
number of functioning councils appear to be in a precarious position. If the trend is indeed
towards large national councils and the demise of smaller councils, then the likely outcome
will be a handful of councils covering only certain sectors, with the vast bulk of the labour
market covered by the BCEA or sectoral determinations or plant-level bargaining (with only
the latter two setting wages). This raises questions about the future nature of the industrial
relations system, particularly given our dearth of knowledge about the extent of plant-level
bargaining and what is being negotiated at plant level.
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1.2   Some Possible Policy Options
What can be done to address the apparent decline? Firstly, any strategy would have to
address the relationship of bargaining councils with small businesses. The data on the
average size of firms indicates that the council system primarily covers small businesses, so
for the system to survive it has to become more representative of small businesses. There
are positive signs. Most of the councils covered in this study appear to have become more
sensitive to issues affecting small business and non-parties. At the same time the research
identifies a number of areas in which the present bargaining council system could be
improved. 
Two challenges face bargaining councils with regard to small business. First, the employers’
organisations on councils need to become more representative of small businesses in
numerical terms. At some councils this has been achieved while at others there is still some
way to go. The second challenge is to ensure that representivity in terms of numbers
translates into effective representation of small business interests in council negotiations. A
third measure of representivity, namely that party employers’ organisations need to be
representative of all employers in the industry might help in this regard. Such a measure
would put pressure on employers’ organisations to recruit smaller firms and to better
accommodate them in their organisation and in the way they approach negotiations. This
should translate into agreements with which small firms can live. However, the threshold for
this measure needs not be set at 50 per cent and the Minister would need to take account of
the nature of the industry and efforts made by the employer parties to organise small firms.
We would also propose that each measure is not viewed on its own; the Minister would need
to take account of the levels of all three measures. 
With regard to the above proposal, it must be emphasised that any moves to change the
system must bear in mind its voluntary nature. Care needs to be taken that any changes do
not create incentives for employers to leave employers’ organisations, thereby making
councils unrepresentative. 
Another policy option would be to encourage councils to give consideration to blanket
exemptions of particular categories of business, particularly new and small businesses. The
phase-in approach adopted by some councils provides a useful example. Blanket
exemptions should, however, not be entirely automatic. To qualify, firms should first register
with councils. This will assist in monitoring and enforcement. It would not be advisable to
introduce a blanket exemption through legislation because only councils know the
circumstances of their sectors and the type of businesses that should qualify for such
exemptions. 
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There are other areas where the bargaining council system can be improved. For example,
there does not appear to be any sound justification for councils to have such long lists of
criteria or to leave applicants in the dark as to how the criteria are weighted. 
However, we believe that more research needs to be done on bargaining councils and small
businesses, In particular, research needs to be done that examines empirically in what ways
councils have a negative impact on small businesses and, if so, why the exemption system is 
not dealing with such cases. In this regard, it should also be noted that the DoL has data on
bargaining councils that is not accessible to the public. We recommend that efforts are made 
to publish this data, so that it can inform the debate about bargaining councils, small
businesses and the labour market.
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2.  The BCEA and Sectoral Determinations
It is difficult to understand why bargaining councils have attracted so much controversy
compared to sectoral determinations, since far more employees are covered by sectoral
determinations than by bargaining councils. And, compared to sectoral determinations, the
number of workers covered by extended bargaining councils agreements is small. One
explanation might be the limited information one has on the sectoral determinations and
BCEA. For example, there is no data on the coverage of ministerial determinations or the
wage determinations that were converted to sectoral determinations by the 2002
amendment to the BCEA. It is also unknown what the level of compliance is with the BCEA
and sectoral determinations. Arguably there is probably a low level of compliance because
of the limited enforcement capacity of the DoL: only 706 inspectors are spread across 10
main offices. 
Furthermore, the guidelines used by DoL to assess applications have not been made public
or do not enjoy very wide publicity and it is difficult to assess the success rate of applications
for variation because of the very high number of applications that were not finalised in
2002/3 and 2003/4.
It is clear that more research needs to be done on the sectoral determinations and BCEA.
They cover a very large number of workers and there is only very sparse data on their
coverage and enforcement. 
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Annexure A
List of bargaining councils to which questionnaires were sent. The councils that completed
and returned questionnaire are marked with an asterisk.
• Building Industry BC (Bloemfontein)*
• Building Industry BC (Boland)
• Building Industry BC (Cape)*
• Building Industry BC (Kimberley)*
• Building Industry BC (Southern and Eastern Cape)45*
• Canvas and Ropeworking Industry (Cape)
• Canvas Industry BC (Witwatersrand and Pretoria)*
• Chemical Industry BC*
• Clothing Industry BC*
• Commercial and Distributive Trade BC (Kimberley)46
• Contract Cleaning Industry BC*
• Diamond Cutting Industry BC*
• Electrical Industry BC*
• Entertainment Industry BC*
• Fishing Industry BC
• Furniture Industry BC (Eastern Cape)*
• Furniture Industry BC (Free State)
• Furniture Industry BC (KwaZulu-Natal)*
• Furniture Industry BC (Northern Region)*
• Furniture Industry BC (South Western Districts)*
• Furniture Industry BC (Western Cape)*
• Grain Co-operative BC*
• Hairdressing and Cosmetology Trade BC (Cape)*
• Hairdressing and Cosmetology Trade BC (KwaZulu-Natal)
• Hairdressing and Cosmetology Trade BC (Pretoria)*
• Hairdressing and Cosmetology Trade BC (Semi-National)*
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45 The council now administers the Building Industry BC (East London). The data supplied by the Building Industry
BC (Southern and Eastern Cape) incorporated the East London council.
46 The Commercial and Distributive Trade BC (Kimberley) has only recently produced an agreement after a period of 
about four years without one. The Secretary did not complete a questionnaire because the council was to all
intents and purposes not functioning during much of the period covered by the questionnaire.
• Jewellery BC*
• Laundry and Dry-Cleaning BC (Cape)*
• Laundry and Dry-Cleaning BC (Natal)*
• Leather Industry BC
• Meat Trade BC (Gauteng)*
• Metal and Engineering Industry BC*
• Motor Industry BC
• Motor Ferry Industry BC
• New Tyre Manufacturing BC
• Passenger Transportation Trade BC
• Restaurant and Catering Trade BC 
• Road Freight Industry BC*
• SA Road Passenger Industry BC*
• Sugar Industry BC
• Tearoom and Restaurant Trade BC (Pretoria)*
• Textile Industry BC*
It should also be noted that although the National Bargaining Council for the Wood and
Paper Sector was not sent a questionnaire because it was registered only in 2005, the
council did participate in the research by providing data on its representivity.
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